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INTRODUCTION
No informed observer has ever been in doubt about the importance of Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins.1 Almost as soon as it was issued, the cognoscenti were
calling it a “transcendently significant opinion,”2 a “thunderclap
decision,”3 and “one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of
the Supreme Court.”4 Seventy-five years later, Erie remains an
“iconic case[ ]”—one that “every lawyer knows ... by name” and that
“is thought to express something basic about the United States legal
system.”5 Above and beyond its immediate holding (which is
obviously important in its own right), Erie has become the starting
point for many modern arguments about federalism and the
separation of powers.
Unfortunately, Erie is a shaky foundation for legal reasoning.
From the standpoint of technical, lawyerly craftsmanship, Justice
Brandeis’s opinion has many vices. It relies on contestable premises
that it does not make explicit. It delivers grand statements that are
misleading in the absence of careful qualification (which it does not
supply). Upon close examination, some of the arguments that it
endorses fall apart entirely, and others are—at best—much more
complicated than it acknowledges. Insofar as it purports to rest on
the Constitution, moreover, it advances arguments so cavalierly and
impressionistically as to impede responsible analysis. In the words
of a contemporaneous student note, “The opinion in Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins lacks much of the precision which an important
reexamination of constitutional distribution of power might be
expected to contain.”6

1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. Arthur Krock, In the Nation: A Momentous Decision of the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES,
May 3, 1938, at 22.
3. Charles T. McCormick & Elvin Hale Hewins, The Collapse of “General” Law in the
Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126, 126 (1938).
4. Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609, 609 (1938).
5. Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 595 (2008).
6. Note, Congress, the Tompkins Case, and the Conflict of Laws, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1002,
1002 (1939) (footnote omitted).
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None of this means that Erie’s bottom line is necessarily wrong.
But lawyers and law professors who seek to extend Erie’s analysis
need to recognize the shoals concealed in Justice Brandeis’s opinion.
It is easy to overread Erie, and it is also easy to find apparent
support in Erie for propositions that are false.
Precisely because Erie is so iconic, of course, it has been analyzed
exhaustively. In recent years, revisionist scholars have made great
strides in understanding both Erie and what came before Erie. To
criticize Justice Brandeis’s opinion in light of this new learning is
surely unfair. But it is still worth doing, because Erie’s status in our
legal firmament makes it crucial to understand exactly what Erie
held and how that holding might be supported.
Erie addressed one of the recurring questions of American federalism: What is the status in federal court of precedents established by the courts of a particular state? Throughout our history,
the answer has depended on what the precedents are about; federal
courts have always felt more need to defer to a state’s highest court
about certain aspects of the state’s own law than about the law of
other sovereigns. Before Erie, however, federal courts drew the
crucial lines in different places than they do now.
As background for analysis of Justice Brandeis’s opinion, Part I
of this Article provides a brief account of the doctrine that prevailed
before Erie. Part II then evaluates each of the main arguments—
historical, practical, and constitutional—that Justice Brandeis
advanced in support of his claim that federal law required a different doctrine. By and large, the criticisms that I will be advancing
are not original to me; although I will be sifting through the
voluminous literature about Erie to highlight what I consider to be
the key points, most of what I have to say has already been said in
one form or another by others. But what this Article lacks in
novelty, I hope that it will make up for in utility. While the new
learning about Erie is gradually spreading, my sense is that many
scholars and most students remain in the grip of outdated understandings. I hope that there is some value in providing a concise
assessment of what Justice Brandeis said, what he may have
meant, and the extent to which what he said or meant is true.
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I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
BEFORE ERIE
Whatever else it did, Erie abandoned what it repeatedly called
“the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson.”7 Justice Brandeis is not to blame for
that label, which was common in the law-review articles of his day.8
But the label has the potential to mislead, for it suggests that
Justice Story’s 1842 opinion in Swift v. Tyson9 was itself a watershed decision—one that broke dramatically from past understandings of the relationship between state and federal courts. At the
time that Brandeis was writing, and for many years thereafter, that
was indeed the conventional view of Swift.10 As modern scholars
have shown, however, Swift was continuous with prior practice.11
Be that as it may, the doctrine that Erie abandoned was part of
a larger set of practices that had many different moving parts and
that could be characterized in many different ways. Rather than
delving into too many complications at the outset, Part I.A simply
summarizes a few important aspects of the bottom line. Before
readers can snicker too much at the idiocy of the nineteenth
century, Part I.B then discusses why smart people might have
drawn the distinctions that this bottom line reflects.

7. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74, 77, 79 (1938).
8. See, e.g., Armistead M. Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson, 16 VA. L. REV. 225,
226-27 (1930); H. Parker Sharp & Joseph B. Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift
v. Tyson Since 1900, 4 IND. L.J. 367 (1929).
9. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
10. See, e.g., Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 81-85, 88 n.85 (1923) (portraying Swift as a radical departure from
previously settled understandings).
11. The seminal article on this point is William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law
and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1513 (1984); see also, e.g., TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE
CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 18 (1981) (“In several ways the Swift decision rested upon
established assumptions concerning the federal courts’ function in the federal system.”). For
an even earlier work that points in the same direction and that also provides an excellent
elaboration of the logic behind Swift and its antecedents, see RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH U.
WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW (1977).
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A. The Bottom Line
To understand the institutional arrangements that prevailed
before Erie, one must start with a distinction that no longer
matters—the distinction between “local” and “general” law. The
“local” law of a particular state included both its written laws (such
as the state constitution and statutes enacted by the state legislature) and at least a portion of its unwritten law (such as rules
grounded in peculiar local customs and rules about the status of
land and other things with a fixed locality in the state).12 Some
aspects of the unwritten law in force in each state, however,
addressed “questions of a more general nature”13 and reflected
sources that were common to all the states. Jurists of the day
referred to this sort of unwritten law as “general” law.14
Within the limits of its legislative competence, each state could
enact statutes to handle questions that would otherwise be governed
by the unwritten law (whether “local” or “general”). On issues that
concededly lay within the state’s legislative jurisdiction, moreover,
such statutes would apply in federal court no less than in state
court.15 In the words of one early opinion of the Federal Supreme
Court, “That the statute law of the States must furnish the rule of
decision to this Court, as far as they comport with the constitution
of the United States, in all cases arising within the respective
States, is a position that no one doubts.”16 Similarly, the other
aspects of each state’s “local” law were also regarded as binding in
federal court. In Swift v. Tyson itself, for instance, Justice Story
12. See, e.g., Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
13. Id. at 18-19.
14. See, e.g., id. at 18.
15. By limiting this statement to “issues that concededly lay within the state’s legislative
jurisdiction,” I am trying to smuggle in two separate qualifications. First, I am assuming that
neither the Federal Constitution nor any other valid aspect of federal law, such as a statute
enacted by Congress, stripped the states of lawmaking power over the relevant issues. (If
federal law put those issues beyond the reach of the states’ lawmaking powers, then neither
state courts nor federal courts were supposed to apply the rules that state law purported to
supply.) Second, I am also assuming that standard conflict-of-law principles, of the sort
applied in federal courts at the time, favored applying the local law of the particular state in
question. (If the conflict-of-law rules applied in federal courts pointed elsewhere, then federal
courts would not apply the local law of the particular state in question even if that state
required its own courts to do so.)
16. Shelby v. Guy, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 361, 367 (1826).
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took for granted that not only “the positive statutes of the state” but
also “local customs having the force of laws” supplied rules of
decision for federal courts.17
On matters governed by the “local” law of a particular state,
moreover, federal courts followed the precedents established by the
state’s highest court about the content of the local law. Thus, if a
state’s highest court had interpreted one of the state’s statutes in a
certain way, and if the propriety of that interpretation was no
longer an open question in the state’s own courts, federal judges
ordinarily were supposed to defer to the state court’s interpretation
(even if they themselves would have read the state statute differently).18 The same was true for settled decisions of the state’s
highest court about the content of the “local” portion of the state’s
unwritten law, such as the local law of real property.19
With respect to questions of “general” law, however, federal
judges saw no need to follow precedents established by the courts of
any particular state. That was true even when the relevant question
17. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.
18. See, e.g., Green v. Lessee of Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 291, 295-301 (1832); Elmendorf v.
Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159-65 (1825); M‘Keen v. Delancy’s Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)
22, 32-33 (1809); see also Thatcher v. Powell, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 119, 127 (1821) (“In
construing the acts of the Legislature of a State, the decisions of the State tribunals have
always governed this Court.”).
Questions could arise at the margins of this principle. For instance, to the extent that a
state supreme court’s gloss on a state statute reflected the court’s understanding of general
jurisprudence rather than anything specific to the statute, did federal courts have to fall into
line? See Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner—Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development of
General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1280 & n.87 (2000) (citing some
nineteenth-century cases that arguably suggest a negative answer). The rise of uniform state
laws raised similar questions. To the extent that many different states had all enacted the
same statutory language, did federal courts have to follow each individual state supreme
court’s understanding of the language as enacted by that state? Did it matter whether the
relevant statutory language was simply a codification of principles that would previously have
been classified as matters of “general” law? See Dobie, supra note 8, at 236-38 (noting that as
of 1930, the Supreme Court had not definitively answered these questions); J.B. Fordham,
The Federal Courts and the Construction of Uniform State Laws, 7 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428-32
(1929) (urging federal courts to follow state-court interpretations even of uniform state laws);
see also Burns Mortg. Co. v. Fried, 292 U.S. 487, 495 (1934) (resolving these questions in favor
of deference to the courts of each individual state); Richard E. Coulson, The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the Control of Law-Making—A
Historical Essay, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 295, 338-40 (1991) (noting that these questions had
divided lower federal courts before Burns).
19. See, e.g., Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 498-500 (1890); Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 153 (1827).
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(as presented in the case that the federal judges were considering)
came within a single state’s legislative jurisdiction, and even when
the highest court of that state had repeatedly expressed its understanding of the proper answer.20 To be sure, if the state legislature
wanted to do so, it could codify that answer in a statute, which the
federal courts would then apply (assuming they agreed that the
state did indeed have legislative jurisdiction21). But even where the
state had this sort of power to override the federal courts’ view of
the general law, doing so required something like a statutory
enactment or the development of an indigenous custom among the
state’s people—something that would take the question out of the
realm of “general” law and transform it into a question of “local”
law.22 As long as the federal courts continued to classify the question
as one of “general” law, they would not feel bound to accept the
answer suggested by the state supreme court’s precedents.
As John Harrison has observed, the legal status of “general” law
during this period might be characterized in different ways.23
Insofar as the “general” law addressed questions that lay within the
legislative competence of individual states (even if they also lay
within the legislative competence of the Federal Congress), the
Supreme Court sometimes described it as being part of the law of
each state. That way of understanding the legal status of the
“general” law may have become especially prominent toward the
end of the nineteenth century.24 Here, for instance, is how the
Supreme Court spoke in one case from 1898:

20. See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370-79 (1893) (summarizing
the doctrine and citing cases).
21. Again, I intend this formulation to incorporate the qualifications described in footnote
15.
22. See, e.g., Baugh, 149 U.S. at 378.
23. John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503,
526 (2000).
24. See Michael G. Collins, Justice Iredell, Choice of Law, and the Constitution—A
Neglected Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 163, 175 (2006) (identifying some pre-Swift
expressions of “[t]he view that the general common law applied in federal courts ... was in fact
state law,” but adding that this view “seemed to become prominent only in the latter part of
the Nineteenth Century”); cf. id. at 171-72 (observing that Justice Iredell’s opinion in United
States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23 (C.C.D. Va. 1795) (No. 15,834), is a much earlier
manifestation of this view).
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The question [presented by this case] ... is ... one of those
questions not of merely local law, but of commercial law or
general jurisprudence, upon which this court, in the absence of
express statute regulating the subject, will exercise its own
judgment, uncontrolled by the decisions of the courts of the State
in which the cause of action arises. But the law to be applied is
none the less the law of the State.25

On this way of thinking, state law came in two flavors—“local” and
“general.” The flavor affected how federal judges handled precedents
established by the state supreme court: federal judges would defer
to the state supreme court about the content of state law on “local”
questions, but federal judges felt free to exercise independent
judgment about the content of state law on “general” questions. But
despite that difference in the federal courts’ practices, the “general”
law in force within any particular state on questions that lay within
the state’s legislative competence was properly regarded as state
law.
I personally am drawn to this way of characterizing the legal
regime before Erie. But a competing account is possible. On this
competing account, “general” law consisted of “a body of rules and
principles separate from the law of any state,” and the conflict-oflaw rules applied in federal court sometimes told federal judges to
draw rules of decision from this body of law rather than from state
law.26 People who took this view of the “general” law would have
acknowledged that with respect to matters within a particular
state’s legislative competence,27 the conflict-of-law rules applied in
federal court pointed toward the “general” law only in the absence
of state statutes; if the state wanted to supersede the “general” law,
the state could pass a statute to that effect, and federal as well as
state courts would then look to the statute rather than the “general”
law for rules of decision. But it was possible to acknowledge that
fact without describing any portion of the “general” law as state law.

25. Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 136 (1898); accord Smith
v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478 (1888).
26. See Harrison, supra note 23, at 526 (describing this alternative way of conceptualizing
the world before Erie); see also FREYER, supra note 11, at 37-38 (casting Swift in these terms).
27. As above, I intend this formulation to import the qualifications described in footnote
15.

2013]

A CRITICAL GUIDE TO ERIE RAILROAD CO. v. TOMPKINS

929

Still, whether people regarded the “general” law on such matters
as state law or as something else, it is clear that they did not regard
it as federal law, at least in any ordinary sense of that term. Except
in unusual situations when the “general” law had been federalized
by a federal statute or the Federal Constitution,28 state courts were
not obliged to defer to the Federal Supreme Court about its
content.29 (By contrast, state courts were expected to follow the
Federal Supreme Court’s precedents about the meaning of federal
statutes, just as federal courts followed state precedents about the
meaning of state statutes.30) Likewise, “general” law was not
considered federal law for purposes of triggering the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review judgments rendered by state
courts.31
B. Were People Crazy Then?
To modern readers, the doctrine articulated by Swift v. Tyson
might seem baffling. Especially to the extent that the “general” law
in force in each state was considered part of that state’s law, how
could federal courts even have contemplated making independent
judgments about its content? After all, to say that “general” law is
state law is to say that it is part of the unwritten law of each
particular state. And what is the unwritten law of each state but
what that state’s highest court says it is?
28. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44, 46-47 (1931) (reversing a
state court’s judgment in a case under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and asserting
that “in proceedings under that Act, wherever brought, the rights and obligations of the
parties depend upon it and applicable principles of common law as interpreted and applied
in the federal courts”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916)
(reversing a state court’s judgment and observing that “the proper measure of damages ... in
cases arising under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act ... must be settled according to
general principles of law as administered in the Federal courts”); see also Caleb Nelson, The
Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 520 (2006) (discussing these cases).
29. See, e.g., Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. 1843) (Walworth, C.) (declining to accede
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Swift v. Tyson with respect to the question of commercial
law at issue in that case).
30. See id. at 95 (“Upon questions arising under the constitution and laws of the United
States, and upon the construction of treaties, the decisions of [the United States Supreme
Court] are binding upon the state courts; and we are bound to conform our decisions to
them.”).
31. See, e.g., San Francisco v. Itsell, 133 U.S. 65, 67 (1890); San Francisco v. Scott, 111
U.S. 768, 768-69 (1884); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286 (1876).
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Modern lawyers often speak in precisely those terms. They tend
to assume that the unwritten law of each state is fundamentally like
the written law of each state, except that it is made by a different
branch of the state government: written law is made by legislatures
and unwritten law is made by appellate courts. Of course, modern
lawyers acknowledge that appellate courts articulating new rules of
unwritten law are subject to two constraints that do not apply to
legislatures enacting new statutes. First, courts making unwritten
law are constrained not only by constitutional provisions (which also
constrain legislatures) but also by ordinary statutes and other
applicable forms of written law. Second, courts making unwritten
law are also constrained by the unwritten law that they or their
hierarchical superiors made in the past; under prevailing norms of
stare decisis, appellate courts cannot “repeal” their prior rules of
unwritten law with the same ease that legislatures can repeal their
prior statutes. But modern lawyers often speak as if these are the
only constraints that courts face in devising new rules of unwritten
law—with the result that the content of such rules is mostly a
matter of judicial discretion. The more firmly one accepts that
conclusion, the more one will equate the unwritten law with
whatever courts say it is. And if one combines that understanding
of the nature of law with certain understandings of federalism,
which put each state in charge of making its own law, one might
well gravitate toward Erie.
Before going any further, then, I want to explain how it might be
possible not to gravitate toward Erie. Without getting too deep into
the history of jurisprudential views (a topic that I am capable of
treating only shallowly), Part I.B.1 flags the possibility of a
distinction between the unwritten law in force in each state and the
state courts’ decisions about the content of that law. Part I.B.2 then
discusses why smart people might have thought it sensible for
federal courts to defer to state judicial decisions with respect to the
content of the “local” portion of the unwritten law in each state but
not with respect to the content of the “general” portion of the
unwritten law in each state.
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1. The Nature and Sources of Unwritten Law32
Neither the authority nor the content of written law is particularly puzzling. A statute is law because a legislature with lawmaking power enacted it. As the label “written law” reflects, moreover,
each statute has a single authoritative formulation. To be sure,
questions are bound to arise about how that formulation should be
interpreted, and courts or other relevant actors may end up
ascribing some meanings to the statute that the legislature did not
make explicit. But subject to the need for interpretation, the law
consists of the words that the legislature enacted, and those words
are law because the legislature enacted them.
“Unwritten” law is different. While it does find written expression
in judicial opinions, treatises, and the like, traditionalists would say
that the unwritten law does not owe its authority to those written
expressions, and those written expressions do not necessarily give
it a single authoritative formulation. In particular, courts do not
enact the common law33 in the way that a legislature enacts a
statute.
If unwritten law is not enacted as a statute is, what supplies its
content, and what gives it its authority? One traditional answer,
endorsed and propagated by Blackstone, was that it is shaped from
the bottom up by the very people who are subject to it (or their
predecessors). On this account, the unwritten law is at least partly
customary law, the content of which grows out of practices that the
people themselves have adopted over time.34
32. A version of this Section was part of the fourth annual David Aldrich Nelson Lecture
in Constitutional Jurisprudence that I recently delivered under the auspices of the Alexander
Hamilton Institute. I am indebted to the Institute for its hospitality.
33. The common law is the prototypical example of “unwritten” law, but that term also
encompasses principles of equity jurisprudence and rules that were typically enforced in
admiralty.
34. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64 (asserting that rules of unwritten law
“receive their binding power, and the force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and by
their universal reception throughout the kingdom”); see also, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN,
supra note 11, at 13-28 (elaborating upon the view that the common law drew much of its
content from “customary norms” established by “the autonomous activities of individuals,” but
noting that Americans did not accept Blackstone’s suggestion that only “immemorial” customs
counted); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV.
1, 23 n.65 (2001) (citing early American references to custom as a source of unwritten law);
Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 754 (1993) (“The common
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This story may fit some areas of law (such as certain aspects of
contract and property law) better than others (such as certain
aspects of tort law). But to understand how customs might give rise
to rules of decision for courts, let us consider one of the areas of law
in which the story seems most natural. Imagine that the merchants
throughout a particular region—or, perhaps, the commercial world
as a whole35—start transacting with each other. As they engage in
law ... has often been understood as a result of social custom rather than an imposition of
judicial will.”).
35. There is a burgeoning academic literature about the geographic scale of mercantile
customs in the distant past. For a long time, conventional wisdom maintained that as longdistance trade increased during the Middle Ages, a fairly uniform set of commercial
practices—based partly on prior law but partly on merchants’ own choices—spread
throughout the commercial world and came to be reflected in legal rules. See, e.g., WILLIAM
MITCHELL, AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT (1904); Harold J. Berman
& Colin Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19
HARV. INT’L L.J. 221, 224-26 (1978); Philip W. Thayer, Comparative Law and the Law
Merchant, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 139 (1936); Leon E. Trakman, The Evolution of the Law
Merchant: Our Commercial Heritage, 12 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1980). More recently, however,
historians have raised grave doubts about whether there really was a substantive “law
merchant” across medieval Europe and, to the extent that there was, whether its content can
properly be attributed to custom. See, e.g., MARY ELIZABETH BASILE ET AL., LEX MERCATORIA
AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE 124 (1998)
(arguing that at least in England, “the concept of a transnational mercantile law was ...
essentially a creation of seventeenth-century lawyers”); Emily Kadens, The Myth of the
Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1158-61 (2012) (arguing that if the term
“custom” refers only to practices that were not codified in statutes or reflected in written
instruments like insurance policies and bills of exchange, the commercial customs that existed
in medieval Europe were “primarily local”); see also Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early
Modern Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 27-30
(2004) (deeming it plausible that medieval Europe had some common practices with respect
to the carriage of goods by sea, but doubting the existence of similarly widespread customs
with respect to other aspects of commerce).
Even if there were relatively few widespread mercantile customs in the Middle Ages,
however, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries might well be a different story. By then,
Anglo-American jurists commonly referred to a “law merchant” that had an international
flavor and that allegedly was consonant with mercantile customs. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 34, at *264 (“[T]he affairs of commerce are regulated by a law of their own, called the law
merchant or lex mercatoria, which all nations agree in and take notice of. And in particular
the law of England does in many cases refer itself to [this law], and leaves the causes of
merchants to be tried by their own peculiar customs.”); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF BILLS OF EXCHANGE, FOREIGN AND INLAND, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA 25 (1843) (“[T]he jurisprudence, which regulates Bills of Exchange, can hardly be
deemed to consist of the mere municipal regulations of any one country. It may, with far more
propriety, be deemed to be founded upon, and to embody, the usages of merchants in different
commercial countries, and the general principles, ex aequo et bono, as to the rights, duties,
and obligations, of the parties, deducible from those usages, and from the principles of natural
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the same kinds of transactions over and over, they might collectively
establish some settled practices about how things are done—what
formalities are necessary for the formation of a binding agreement,
what subsidiary terms go along with agreements of certain sorts,
and so forth. To the extent that such customs do indeed develop,
courts might well use them as a basis for conclusions about the legal
rights and duties associated with particular transactions. When
courts rely on custom in this way, moreover, they will not necessarily think that they are simply choosing as a matter of their own
discretion to make the unwritten law match the established
customs. Instead, they may see the established customs as controlling their decision in the way that a statute might—as supplying a
rule of decision that they are bound to apply.36

law applicable thereto.”); see also, e.g., Bank of the U.S. v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 711,
736 (1844) (describing “the law-merchant” as “that law which pervades the commercial world,
and which, though founded on usage, has become as fixed and definite as any other branch
of the law”). To be sure, merchants of that era would have had to pay attention to the
commercial codes of individual nations. See Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and
Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2008, at 169, 179-80, 186-87 (summarizing some modern scholars’
differing takes on those codes). Insofar as the codes either incorporated or left room for the
play of customs, moreover, American judges acknowledged that “the custom of merchants
somewhat varies in different countries.” Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 368 (1797). Still,
many nineteenth-century judicial opinions asserted the existence of fairly widespread
mercantile practices. See, e.g., Turner v. Yates, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 14, 26 (1854) (referring to
a “universal usage of the commercial world”); Townsley v. Sumrall, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 170, 180
(1829) (referring to “the general custom of merchants in the United States”); Bank of Wash.
v. Triplett, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 25, 31 (1828) (“The allowance of days of grace [for payment on a
bill of exchange] is a usage, which pervades the whole commercial world. It is now universally
understood to enter into every bill, or note, of a mercantile character.”).
36. The following passage, written by a state judge at the end of the eighteenth century,
expresses this idea crisply:
[One] branch of common law is derived from certain usages and customs,
universally assented to and adopted in practice by the citizens at large, or by
particular classes of men, as the farmers, the merchants, etc. as applicable to
their particular business, and to all others of the same description, which are
reasonable and beneficial.
These customs or regulations, when thus assented to and adopted in practice,
have an influence upon the course of trade and business, and are necessary to
be understood and applied in the construction of transactions had and contracts
entered into with reference to them: To this end the courts of justice take notice
of them as rules of right, and as having the force of laws formed and adopted
under the authority of the people.
Jesse Root, On the Common Law of Connecticut, in 1 Root ix, xi-xii (Conn. 1798).
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In addition to custom, early American lawyers and judges also
identified reason as a source of unwritten law.37 The interaction
between custom and reason is a tricky subject, and jurists of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries probably did not all understand it in the same way.38 But there are certainly some respects in
which custom and reason might work together to dictate rules of
decision for courts. Suppose, for instance, that a particular dispute
raises a question on which the relevant community has yet to
establish a specific custom. Using analogical reasoning, courts
might be able to identify an appropriate rule of decision grounded
in a custom that exists on some other matter, and the analogy might
be sufficiently strong for the courts to consider it binding upon
them. Likewise, the data points supplied by existing customs might
sometimes guide courts toward broader principles that are supported by social practices and that dictate answers to various
questions of first impression.39 Indeed, customs of a different sort
might even provide a basis for more instrumental forms of reasoning: perhaps established social practices or accepted principles of
moral philosophy identify some uncontroversial metrics for evaluating policy outcomes, and perhaps courts applying those metrics can
sometimes conclude that one possible rule of decision will produce
better results than any of the logical alternatives. Admittedly, this
style of thinking might not seem distinctively judicial; if such
uncontroversial metrics do exist, legislatures too are likely to use
them. But such metrics might conceivably be understood to bind
courts in a way that they do not bind legislatures—so that there is
37. See, e.g., 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
39 (1795) (indicating that “the dictates of reason[ ] and the science of morals” supplied “first
principles” of the unwritten law, though acknowledging that “our courts have erected an
artificial fabrick of jurisprudence” on the foundation of these principles); see also JOSEPH
HOPKINSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ABOLITION OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
19, 21 (1809) (calling the common law “the law of reason and justice”).
38. See James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Confuse Custom and
Reason?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1325 (1991).
39. See id. at 1326 (noting that “a number of scholars have argued that the best of
common law theory down through the ages has offered precisely this kind of sophisticated
reconciliation of custom and reason,” under which “reason” refers to “a body of sound
principles revealed through the lived experience of custom”). But cf. id. at 1326-27 (noting that
many writings of revolutionary-era lawyers instead “speak of ... ‘immutable maxims of reason
and justice’ to be discovered through deductive thought, not through lived experience,” and
observing that “such a deductive concept of reason is very difficult to reconcile with custom”).
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a sense in which courts would be acting unlawfully if they based the
rules of decision that they articulate on their own preferences rather
than the preferences reflected in these accepted metrics.
The point of this discussion is not to persuade readers that the
unwritten law is entirely “discovered” by judges and not at all
“made” by judges. Even in the eighteenth century, lawyers did not
take such a categorical stance: while they saw external sources like
custom and reason as dictating some rules of unwritten law, or at
least as constraining the range of possibilities, they acknowledged
that judicial decisions were “another important source of common
law.”40 But the idea that judicial decisions were the only source of
unwritten law was a fringe position, associated with radicals like
Jeremy Bentham.41
Of course, even if the unwritten law had some external sources,
and even if those external sources played a substantial role in
dictating rules of decision for courts in cases of first impression, the
conclusions reached by judges could still take on great significance
in later cases. Thus, despite all his talk about the common law as
customary law, Blackstone called judicial decisions “the principal
and most authoritative evidence, that can be given, of the existence
of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law.”42 Yet
Blackstone still saw a distinction between the unwritten law and
40. Root, supra note 36, at xiii.
41. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Bentham mounted a persistent
attack on then-orthodox understandings of the common law. Bentham insisted that the
common law was entirely the invention of the courts: whenever a judge needed to determine
its content, “either he makes for the purpose a piece of law of his own, ... or ... he refers to, and
adopts, ... a piece of law already made ... by some other Judge or Judges.” JEREMY BENTHAM,
SUPPLEMENT TO PAPERS RELATIVE TO CODIFICATION AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION 108 (1817). That
was bad enough; Bentham considered judge-made law illegitimate, and he contrasted the
common law with what he called “real” law (to wit, written law). See, e.g., id. at 105-08. But
in Bentham’s view, the illegitimacy of the common law was compounded by the fact that
judges articulated it after the fact, in cases about events that had already occurred. In a
broadside that he wrote in 1792, Bentham expressed this point with customary flair:
It is the Judges ... that make the common law[.] Do you know how they make it?
Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog does any thing you want
to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way
you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the Judges make law for you
and me.
JEREMY BENTHAM, TRUTH VERSUS ASHHURST; OR LAW AS IT IS, CONTRASTED WITH WHAT IT IS
SAID TO BE 11 (1823).
42. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *69.
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what judicial decisions said about the unwritten law. As he
expressed this point, “the law, and the opinion of the judge are not
always ... one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen
that the judge may mistake the law.”43 In keeping with this view,
Blackstone observed that when subsequent judges identified such
a mistake and concluded that a former decision should therefore be
overruled, they did not “pretend to make a new law, but [rather] to
vindicate the old one from misrepresentation.”44 They would say
“not that such a [precedent] was bad law, but that it was not law;
that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has
been erroneously determined.”45
For practical purposes, this distinction might sometimes seem
artificial.46 Especially after courts had begun to develop strong
doctrines of stare decisis, a lawyer who was asked to identify the
unwritten law on some point might naturally begin by investigating
whether the courts had established a settled doctrine on that point.
If they had, the lawyer might proceed to investigate whether that
doctrine was so well settled that the courts were unlikely to overrule
it. And if it was, the lawyer might report that the unwritten law on
this point was what the judicial decisions said it was, even if those
decisions had been mistaken about the customs of the relevant
community. To be sure, as people in that community received this
legal advice, they might change their customs to conform to the
judicial decisions, with the result that the judicial decisions and the
prevailing customs might eventually come into alignment. But as
long as a gap between the two remained, practically minded
people—including lawyers trying to advise clients about how courts
were likely to handle their cases—might well identify the unwritten
law (or at least the unwritten law that mattered) with the doctrine

43. Id. at *71.
44. Id. at *70.
45. Id.; see also, e.g., BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 11, at 11-12 (noting that insofar
as the content of the common law was thought to be supplied by the customs of the people
rather than the decrees of the government, “precedent and custom would be viewed as
distinct”).
46. See, e.g., William H. Rand, Jr., Swift v. Tyson Versus Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 8 HARV. L.
REV. 328, 329 (1895) (“The majority of philosophical and non-judicial writers ... have regarded
Blackstone’s conclusions as superficial and unsound.”).
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defined by the judicial decisions rather than the alternative doctrine
suggested by the actual customs of the relevant community.47
Still, when this same phenomenon arises in other areas of law
whose external sources are more obvious, many lawyers see some
value in speaking precisely enough to distinguish between the law
as dictated by the external sources and the law as understood by the
courts. Thus, modern lawyers conversing about constitutional law
might say something like this: “The Constitution plainly establishes
Rule X, but the Supreme Court has interpreted it to establish
Rule Y instead, and the Court is not going to overrule that interpretation.” All modern lawyers would understand the distinction that
this statement draws, and relatively few would consider it completely artificial or incoherent.
Lawyers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
sometimes drew this sort of distinction not only with respect to
written law, but also with respect to unwritten law. In particular,
they did not always and automatically treat the content of the
unwritten law as being identical to the sum total of whatever courts
said about it. A remark made by Virginia Chancellor Creed Taylor
in 1809 nicely illustrates this point. In 1776, a Virginia convention
had specified that notwithstanding independence, “the common law
of England ... shall be the rule of decision [in Virginia], and shall be
considered as in full force, until the same shall be altered by the
legislative power of this colony.”48 As Chancellor Taylor observed,
however, this ordinance did not require him to accept English
judicial opinions as accurately stating the content of the common
law of England. In Taylor’s words, “it was the common law we
adopted, and not English decisions.”49
47. Cf. Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV.
6, 12 (1910) (“[T]he acceptance and application of the common-law principle of the authority
of precedent in a given jurisdiction eats up and destroys the theory that the decisions of the
court are only evidence of the law. The two principles are entirely inconsistent; if you accept
one you cannot have the other.”).
48. An Ordinance to Enable the Present Magistrates and Officers to Continue the
Administration of Justice, and for Settling the General Mode of Proceedings in Criminal and
Other Cases Till the Same Can Be More Amply Provided For (July 3, 1776), in ORDINANCES
PASSED AT A GENERAL CONVENTION, OF DELEGATES AND REPRESENTATIVES, FROM THE SEVERAL
COUNTIES AND CORPORATIONS OF VIRGINIA 9, 10 (1816).
49. Marks v. Morris, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 463, 463 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1809). Admittedly,
Taylor proceeded to reveal a rather indefinite understanding of what the common law
commanded. See id. (“[W]e should take the standard of that law, namely, that we would live

938

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:921

2. Who Should Defer to Whom About What?
To say that “common law” (or “unwritten law” more generally) is
not just another name for “judicial decisions” is a preliminary step
in helping to make sense of the doctrine that existed before Erie, but
it does not itself account for that doctrine. After all, the doctrine
that existed before Erie did not tell federal judges to make independent judgments about the content of all aspects of state law that
had sources external to the state courts. The legal rules established
by state statutes and state constitutions certainly have such
sources, but the doctrine that existed before Erie nonetheless told
federal courts to defer to the relevant state’s highest court about
their content. The same goes for the unwritten law in force in each
state on questions that the federal courts classified as “local” rather
than “general.” Like “general” law, the “local” portion of the
honestly, should hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due, for our judicial guide.”);
see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 34, at *40 (quoting the same three precepts, which trace
back to the Institutes of Justinian); cf. Max Radin, Book Review, 24 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 941, 943
(1949) (reviewing READINGS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., 1949))
(“That the learned Chancellor has taken the famous three principles of Ulpian as a full and
adequate guide to the common law, is an indication of a certain vagueness in the current
understanding of the common law.”). But whatever Taylor’s own sense of the underlying
sources or content of the common law, he was not alone in refusing to equate “the common law
of England” with the decisions of English courts. Indeed, such statements persisted into the
twentieth century. See, e.g., Callet v. Alioto, 290 P. 438, 440 (Cal. 1930) (agreeing that
although California’s reception statute adopted “[t]he common law of England,” California
courts are “not ... bound by the English interpretation of the common law,” and explaining
that “judicial decisions do not themselves constitute the common law, but are merely evidence
of the common law”); State v. Wilson, 161 S.E. 104, 110 (S.C. 1931) (“While the common law
of England is of force in this state, except where it has been abrogated or modified by
legislative enactment, the courts of this state, in construing the common law, are not bound
by the decisions of the courts of England, for ‘We have a right to take our own view of the
Common Law.’” (quoting Shecut v. McDowel, 6 S.C.L. (1 Tread.) 35 (1812))); Ingram v. Fred,
210 S.W. 298, 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918) (“The decisions of the English courts are not
conclusive proof of what the common law of England really is, although they are entitled to
great weight.”); cf. In re Heaton’s Estate, 96 A. 21, 29 (Vt. 1915) (“Some courts hold to the view
that the common law thus adopted is identical with the decisions of the courts; or, in other
words, they regard the common law of England as what the English courts make it. The
predominating view, however, is that precedents do not constitute the common law, but only
serve to illustrate its principles.”). But see Musser v. Musser, 221 S.W. 46, 48 (Mo. 1920)
(“[T]he common law in this country is inseparably identified with the decisions of the courts.”);
cf. Pope, supra note 47, at 12-14 (acknowledging that “[w]e shall find many state courts
repeating the statement that it was the English common law that was adopted and not the
decisions of English courts,” but arguing that this distinction is chimerical).
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unwritten law was understood to have sources external to judicial
decisions, but the doctrine that existed before Erie still told federal
courts to follow the state supreme court’s settled precedents about
its content.
Different cases offered different explanations for these patterns
of deference. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (which went on
to play an important role in Justice Brandeis’s argument in Erie and
which Part II of this Article will therefore discuss in more detail)
specified that except when written federal law otherwise required,
“the laws of the several states ... shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States
in cases where they apply.”50 In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story seemed
to read this language as obliging federal courts to heed not only “the
positive statutes of [each] state” but also “the construction thereof
adopted by the local tribunals.”51 In actions at law, then, it was
possible to argue that Congress itself had instructed the federal
judiciary to accept the settled doctrines of each state’s courts about
the meaning of that state’s statutes. According to some modern
scholars, however, the Supreme Court did not firmly embrace that
argument until the second half of the nineteenth century.52 In any
event, section 34 of the Judiciary Act covered only “trials at common
law,”53 and federal courts sitting in equity also routinely followed
state-court decisions about the meaning of state statutes. Chief
Justice Marshall attributed the federal courts’ practice on this point
to the commands of unwritten law: in his view, the need to accept
the state courts’ interpretations of state statutes reflected the
50. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
51. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842); see also, e.g., Bucher v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 125 U.S. 555,
582-83 (1888) (“It has been held by this court that the decisions of the highest court of a State
in regard to the ... meaning of the constitution of that State, or its statutes, are to be
considered as the law of that State, within the requirement of this section.”).
52. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and
Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1388-89 (1992) (arguing that
“[u]ntil 1863, ... the Court never based its deference [to state-court decisions about the
meaning of state statutes] on the 1789 Act,” but “[i]nstead ... founded its deference on a
number of practical and political considerations”).
53. 1 Stat. at 92; see also United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 363 (1852) (“The
language of this section cannot, upon any fair construction, be extended beyond civil cases at
common law, as contradistinguished from suits in equity.”). That limitation in section 34 and
its successors persisted until 1948, when Congress revised the provision to cover all “civil
actions.” See 62 Stat. 869, 944 (1948) (enacting the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1652).
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application to American federalism of a principle that was “universally recognised” among separate sovereigns.54 Given the uniqueness of America’s federal system, though, the unwritten law of
nations did not necessarily supply determinate answers to questions
about the relationship between state and federal courts. Thus,
federal judges often described their patterns of deference to statecourt precedents as being “a matter of policy” rather than something
that preexisting law had dictated.55
To avoid complicating my exposition with technical distinctions
(such as the distinction between cases that were subject to
section 34 of the Judiciary Act and cases that were not), the rest of
this Part will proceed as if the federal courts’ practices about
deferring to state-court precedents were entirely up for grabs in the
54. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 159 (1825). Here is a fuller version of
the relevant passage from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Elmendorf (which was a suit
in equity):
This Court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases depending on the
laws of a particular State, to adopt the construction which the Courts of the
State have given to those laws. This course is founded on the principle, supposed
to be universally recognised, that the judicial department of every government,
where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the
legislative acts of that government. Thus, no Court in the universe, which
professed to be governed by principle, would, we presume, undertake to say, that
the Courts of Great Britain, or of France, or of any other nation, had
misunderstood their own statutes, and therefore erect itself into a tribunal
which should correct such misunderstanding. We receive the construction given
by the Courts of the nation as the true sense of the law, and feel ourselves no
more at liberty to depart from that construction, than to depart from the words
of the statute. On this principle, the construction given by this Court to the
constitution and laws of the United States is received by all as the true
construction; and on the same principle, the construction given by the Courts of
the several States to the legislative acts of those States, is received as true,
unless they come in conflict with the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.
Id. at 159-60.
55. Woolsey v. Dodge, 30 F. Cas. 606, 609 (C.C.D. Ohio 1854) (No. 18,032) (discussing
deference to state-court precedents about the meaning of state statutes), aff’d, 59 U.S. (18
How.) 331 (1856); see also, e.g., Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 363 (1828) (Story, J.) (“In
the construction of local statutes we have been in the habit of respecting and following the
judgments of the local tribunals.”); Springer v. Foster, 22 F. Cas. 1007, 1008 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) (No. 13,265) (Story, J.) (similarly calling this practice “the constant habit of the courts
of the United States”); cf. Beauregard v. City of New Orleans, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 497, 502
(1856) (describing the Supreme Court’s practice of deferring to each state’s courts about the
local aspects of that state’s unwritten law as “the habit of the [C]ourt,” though adding that
“[n]o other course could be adopted with any regard to propriety”).
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early Republic. Thus, I will be assuming that neither preexisting
rules of unwritten law nor anything in written federal law identified
any particular circumstances in which federal courts were bound to
follow state-court precedents about the content of any particular
type of law. When we get to Erie, I will relax that assumption; Part
II will examine Justice Brandeis’s arguments about both section 34
of the Judiciary Act and the Federal Constitution. For now, though,
I simply want to explain why the doctrines that existed before Erie
might have seemed sensible to judges who thought that they had
some choice in the matter.
a. Deference on Questions of “Local” Law
Even in the absence of any legal compulsion, one can readily
understand why federal courts might have developed the practice of
accepting the settled decisions of each state’s highest court about
the meaning of that state’s written laws. In addition to comporting
with abstract notions of state sovereignty (which were surely
significant despite being abstract), this practice had some very
practical benefits for the citizenry. After all, the question of whether
federal courts should defer to the established precedents of a state’s
highest court about the meaning of that state’s statutes would arise
only after the state’s highest court had established such precedents.
If the federal courts chose not to follow those precedents but instead
to exercise independent judgment about the meaning of the state’s
statutes, some state statutes would have accumulated at least two
different sets of glosses—one that applied in the state’s courts and
one that applied in the federal courts. (Indeed, if the courts of other
states followed the federal courts’ lead and exercised their own
judgment about the meaning of sister states’ written laws, it is
conceivable that three or four different sets of glosses might have
accumulated on some questions.) That sort of disuniformity about
the content of the applicable legal rule “would produce unfortunate
conflicts and encourage litigation.”56 But those “unfortunate
conflicts” about the meaning of each state’s statutes would be
avoided, or at least substantially reduced, if the federal courts did
defer to the settled decisions of each state’s highest court about the
56. Woolsey, 30 F. Cas. at 609.
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meaning of that state’s written laws. The precedents established by
the highest court of the enacting state provided a natural coordination point for both the federal courts and the courts of other states,57
and the practice of deferring to those precedents therefore made
good practical sense.
That was true even though nineteenth-century treatises tended
to portray the principles of statutory interpretation as matters of
general jurisprudence that looked much the same in each American
state,58 and even though the Federal Supreme Court might have
been just as good at applying those general principles as the
supreme court of any particular state. Indeed, perhaps the Federal
Supreme Court would have been somewhat better at this task than
the typical state supreme court—with the result that independent
federal interpretations of state statutes might, in the aggregate,
have been more accurate than the state supreme courts’ interpretations. Even so, federal courts could sensibly have concluded that this
prospect was not enough to justify perpetuating two different
interpretations when it would have been possible for the courts to
coordinate on one.59
57. Cf. Bank of the U.S. v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 53 (1838) (implicitly suggesting
that it is natural to defer to the settled constructions adopted by the courts of the state “where
[the statutes] are exclusively in force”).
58. See, e.g., JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES
45-79 (1873) (collecting “the leading principles of statutory interpretation” and supporting
them with citations drawn from many different jurisdictions); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (1857) (“[T]he rules governing the application of statutes may,
as a general proposition, be considered the same in both [England and the United States].”).
This portrayal of the principles of statutory interpretation was perfectly reasonable. To be
sure, patterns of linguistic usage often show some regional variations. Other things that can
vary from state to state, like governmental structures, may also generate some differences in
interpretive methods. Cf. Bell, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 359-60 (noting that even though a Kentucky
statute was worded substantially the same as a prior English statute, the construction of the
Kentucky statute “justly belongs to the local state tribunals, whose rules of interpretation
must be presumed to be founded upon a more just and accurate view of their own
jurisprudence, than those of any foreign tribunal, however respectable”). But one still would
have expected the common aspects of the interpretive principles used in the United States to
swamp the state-specific aspects.
59. Admittedly, having federal courts defer to the state courts’ settled interpretations of
state statutes was not the only conceivable way of avoiding disuniformity. Even if the federal
courts had chosen not to follow the state courts’ interpretations of state statutes, the resulting
disuniformity could have been eliminated if the state courts subsequently abandoned their
precedents and deferred to the views expressed by the federal courts. But federal judges could
sensibly have concluded that there was little realistic prospect that the courts of each state
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The same practical arguments also support the federal courts’
practice of following each state supreme court’s settled precedents
about the content of the state’s unwritten law on matters that were
localized to that state. Of course, people might disagree about which
matters were sufficiently localized to warrant this treatment.60 But
everyone agreed that there was some core set of questions that were
properly regarded as matters of “local” law—such as various
questions about the powers and immunities of municipal governments within a state,61 or the customary law established by certain
peculiar local usages,62 or rules of decision about the transmission
of real property located within a particular state.63 Again, the
precedents of the highest court of the state where these questions
were localized provided a natural coordination point for both federal
courts and the courts of other states. By following the settled
precedents of the relevant state’s highest court on matters of that
state’s “local” law, federal and state courts could avoid “[t]he
injustice, as well as the absurdity of the former deciding by one rule,
and the latter by another,” on such questions as the ownership of
land within the state.64 In the words of the Federal Supreme Court,
“There should be, in all matters of a local nature, but one law within
the State; and that law is not what this court might determine, but
what the Supreme Court of the State has determined.”65

would consistently follow this course. For various reasons, the decisions of each state’s
supreme court provided a more natural coordination point for interpretation of that state’s
statutes than the decisions of the federal courts.
60. Compare BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 11, at 119-22 (describing the Supreme
Court’s growing tendency after 1860 to characterize various questions of tort law as “general”
rather than “local”), with id. at 121 (criticizing this development and arguing that “tort law
was vastly different in kind from the general customs of the commercial world”).
61. See, e.g., Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492, 499 (1890).
62. See, e.g., HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 154 (1896).
63. See, e.g., Bucher v. Cheshire R.R. Co., 125 U.S. 555, 583 (1888) (providing examples
of this “well settled” point).
64. Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, 543-44 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509). To the extent
that local law grew out of peculiar local customs, the federal courts’ practice of deferring to
the highest court of the relevant state might also have increased the accuracy of the federal
courts’ decisions. After all, the state supreme court could be expected to have more local
knowledge than the Federal Supreme Court.
65. Osborne, 135 U.S. at 498.
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b. Non-Deference on Questions of “General” Law
One might think that the same ideas would have led the federal
courts to defer to the settled precedents of each state’s highest court
on questions about the content of the “general” law too. But that
assumption neglects the crucial difference between questions of
“general” law and questions of “local” law. To the extent that rules
of “general” law were thought to reflect the customs and usages of
some broad community, or the dictates of widely accepted principles
of moral philosophy, or even just the collective thrust of judicial
decisions from a multitude of different jurisdictions, neither the
sources of these rules nor the matters that they governed were
confined to any single state. As a result, there was no single state
whose courts supplied a natural coordination point about the rules’
content.
A stylized example helps illustrate one aspect of the problem.
Suppose that a certain type of transaction becomes popular in the
commercial world, and the courts of various jurisdictions all
confront cases about the rights and duties of the merchants who
participate in such transactions. Suppose further that these courts
all agree that if merchants throughout the commercial world have
established customary practices with respect to these transactions,
those practices dictate the applicable rules of decision. The supreme
court of State A ultimately concludes that merchants in the
commercial world have indeed established a relevant custom, and
the court proceeds to express its understanding of that custom (and
hence the applicable rule of decision). The courts of the other states
facing the same question would surely give respectful consideration
to that understanding. But at least until a consensus emerges
across jurisdictions, each of the other states’ courts is likely to
exercise some independent judgment about the content of the
relevant custom—and if the supreme court of State B concludes that
its counterpart in State A was mistaken, the supreme court of State
B is likely to follow its own understanding and articulate a different
rule of decision.66 In the nineteenth century, indeed, the supreme
66. Professors Teply and Whitten, whose casebook on civil procedure discusses Swift v.
Tyson better than any other modern casebook, explain this point as follows:
The general commercial law was, by definition, a body of world-wide custom. A
state choosing to follow the general commercial law was, therefore, choosing to
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court of State B was likely to exercise its own judgment about the
customs of merchants in the commercial world even if the transaction at issue in the case had occurred within State A.67
Of course, the fact that most state courts did not feel bound to
accept a single sister state’s understanding of the general law does
not necessarily mean that federal courts also had to exercise
independent judgment on this topic. Whatever the state courts’
practices on this point, one could imagine federal courts applying
the rule of decision identified by the supreme court of State A in
cases about transactions within State A and the contrary rule of
decision identified by the supreme court of State B in cases about
transactions within State B. Admittedly, some transactions might
cross state lines in such a way as to impede assigning them to a
single state for this purpose: if a merchant in State A enters into a
long-distance contract with a merchant in State B, what determines
whether courts should treat the contract as having been made in
State A or State B? But that was a standard problem in conflict-oflaw analysis, and nineteenth-century courts already had to face it
in cases about the applicability of rules of “local” law. For instance,
if a particular state’s legislature had enacted a special local statute
that supplanted the “general” law in some respect, courts throughout the country would have had to use conflict-of-law analysis to
identify the cases that were governed by this statute.68 One could
follow law whose content had been “fixed” over centuries by the practices of
merchants trading internationally. Therefore, the task for the state courts in
general commercial law cases was one of identifying the worldwide custom. A
single state’s opinion on a general commercial law matter could not bind all
other states and nations.
LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 428 (4th ed. 2009); cf. supra note 35
(adding qualifications about the supposed universality of mercantile custom).
67. See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1122
(2011) (“At the time that Swift was decided, most state courts followed the decisions of sisterstate courts only concerning local usages and the interpretations of sister-state statutes. If
the matter concerned the general common law—such as commercial law or the law
merchant—they would opine about this law without any special deference to what the sister
state’s courts had said.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1113 (making clear that this point applied
even with respect to common-law actions that had accrued in the sister state). But see id. at
1124 (noting that “not every state” followed this practice, and citing Connecticut as a
counterexample); id. at 1124-25 (citing the counterexample later provided by Forepaugh v.
Delaware Railroad, 128 Pa. 217 (1889)).
68. See, e.g., TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 66, at 424 (noting the relevance of conflict-oflaw principles in determining which state’s “local law” governed which questions).
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imagine the federal courts using the same conflict-of-law principles
not only when a particular state had explicitly enacted a special rule
of “local” law, but also when the courts of a particular state had
embraced a controversial understanding of the content of the
“general” law.
That approach, however, would have had some disadvantages.
For one thing, it would have substantially increased the number of
cases in which federal courts had to ascribe cross-border transactions to a single state, and the conflict-of-law doctrines that existed
in the early nineteenth century may not have been sufficiently well
developed to handle this added pressure effectively.69 Even if federal
courts could surmount this problem, moreover, they would not be
guaranteeing uniformity in the rules of decision applicable to the
transactions that they assigned to a particular state. After all, even
if the federal courts bowed to the understanding of the general law
expressed by the highest court of that state, neither the courts of
other states nor the courts of foreign countries would necessarily do
so.70
Perhaps more important, the federal courts would be sacrificing
the opportunity to promote a different sort of uniformity. Especially
in the nineteenth century, when the United States was not the
economic hegemon that it later became, there might have been real
value to harmonizing American understandings of the general
commercial law with the prevailing views in other commercial
countries. To see why, imagine that merchants throughout the
commercial world had thought that if they dealt with American
merchants, there was a significant risk that their legal rights and
duties would later be assessed according to the idiosyncratic
understanding of the courts of a particular American state. To avoid
this uncertainty (and the transaction costs associated with regularly
69. See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Continental Law and Common Law: Historical Strangers or
Companions?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1207, 1222-23 (describing the state of Anglo-American
jurisprudence about the conflict of laws before 1834, when Joseph Story published his treatise
on the subject); Jenny S. Martinez, International Courts and the U.S. Constitution:
Reexamining the History, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1069, 1121 (2011) (“The field of conflict of laws
was still immature in Anglo-American law in the 1820s.”).
70. That prospect itself amounted to a significant distinction between matters of “general”
law and matters of “local” law. The federal courts could be fairly confident that if they
deferred to the highest court of each state about the meaning of that state’s statutes, so too
would the courts of other states and foreign countries. See supra note 54.
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having to consult local lawyers who had access to local case reports),
they might have been inclined to take their business elsewhere. By
contrast, if foreign merchants knew that federal courts throughout
the United States would exercise independent judgment about the
content of the general commercial law, and if foreign merchants also
knew that they were likely to have access to federal courts through
diversity jurisdiction, they might have been fairly confident that
their transactions with merchants in any particular American state
would end up being assessed according to the “normal” rules of
decision. To the extent that federal courts could inspire that
confidence, their willingness to exercise independent judgment
about the content of the general law might have promoted various
benefits associated with uniformity, such as greater predictability
and lower transaction costs.71
Just as the doctrine that the Supreme Court articulated in Swift
v. Tyson might have helped make merchants in foreign countries
more willing to deal with merchants in the United States, so too it
might have helped create favorable conditions for purely domestic
transactions between merchants located in different states. Again,
picture a merchant in one state who was thinking about whether to
limit himself to in-state transactions or instead to expand his
business dealings to other states. The prospect of having access to
federal courts that would apply a uniform understanding of the
general commercial law might well have made the latter course
seem more appealing than it otherwise would have.
These arguments presuppose that merchants were sophisticated
enough to anticipate the possibility of legal disputes before engaging
in transactions. That premise is surely plausible, but let us suppose
that it is false. Even apart from the idea that American commerce
might benefit from the arrangements reflected in Swift, federal
courts might well have thought that simple fairness to the parties
pointed in the same direction. Especially if merchants were
relatively unsophisticated about the law, they presumably entered
into transactions according to the actual customs of merchants
throughout the commercial world rather than according to whatever
71. Cf. Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the Eighth
Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149, 1184 (2006) (“Nations and states followed the law
merchant in order to facilitate international and interstate trade by establishing uniform
rules to govern transactions among diverse citizens.”).
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the courts of a single jurisdiction had said about those customs. To
the extent that the courts of two different states disagreed with each
other about the customs of merchants throughout the commercial
world, moreover, at least one of them was wrong. The federal courts
might not have seen any need to assess transactions according to an
erroneous view of the customary law simply because those transactions happened to have occurred within a state whose courts did not
understand mercantile practices very well.72
Much the same point helps explain why even if the general law on
most questions was classified as state law, federal courts would not
have thought that notions of state sovereignty required them to
defer to the highest courts of individual states about its content.
Within the limits of each state’s legislative jurisdiction, each state
certainly had sovereign authority to decide whether to let the
general law operate or instead to prescribe a special statutory code
of its own. But a state’s decision to adopt the general law did not
necessarily localize the general law in such a way that federal courts
had to treat the state courts’ precedents about its content in the
same way that federal courts would have treated precedents about
the meaning of a local state statute.73
By expressing their own considered views about the content of the
general law, moreover, federal courts could conceivably help to
promote uniform understandings of the general law even in the
state courts. The Federal Supreme Court arguably had an especially
good opportunity to do so. After all, if any American court could
serve as a coordination point for other American courts on questions
about the content of the general law, that court was the Supreme
Court of the United States (as opposed to the highest court of any
individual state).74 To be sure, state courts were not thought to have
72. Cf. Green, supra note 67, at 1129 (“Since commercial custom is a matter of fact,
[Professor Lessig] argues that it was not odd that Story thought that courts of different
sovereigns could exercise their own judgment about what the law merchant was.”); Lawrence
Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1785, 1792 (1997) (arguing that Swift made sense as long as the common law was
understood to be “reflective, or mirroring of private understandings,” as opposed to being
“directive, or normative over those private understandings”).
73. See TEPLY & WHITTEN, supra note 66, at 424-25 (explaining this point and linking it
to “the nature of the sovereign choice that New York had made in deciding to follow general
commercial law rather than local law”).
74. See J. Benton Hurst, Note, De Facto Supremacy: Supreme Court Control of State
Commercial Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 691, 712 (2012) (discussing the Federal Supreme Court’s
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any legal obligation to follow what the Federal Supreme Court said
about the content of the general law. Nonetheless, federal judges
sometimes suggested that there were policy reasons for state courts
to do so,75 and state courts sometimes agreed.76 Apart from this
argument for deference, the federal courts’ considered opinions
about the content of the general law might simply have been salient
and persuasive to the courts of individual states. Consistent with
this hypothesis, some scholars have concluded that the doctrine
associated with Swift did help homogenize the common law as it
was applied in the courts of the various states.77
capacity to “creat[e] centers of gravity that state courts could gather around”).
75. See, e.g., Browning v. Andrews, 4 F. Cas. 452, 453 (C.C.D. Mich. 1845) (No. 2040) (“The
reason which influences the [federal] supreme court to follow the states in the construction
of their statutes, it would seem, should influence the state courts to follow the rule of decision
of the supreme court of the Union on questions of general law.”); Riley v. Anderson, 20 F. Cas.
801, 802 (C.C.D. Ohio 1841) (No. 11,835) (advancing a similar argument for the broader
proposition that “on all questions of a general and commercial character, the rule established
by the federal courts should be followed by the local tribunals”).
76. Before Swift v. Tyson, for instance, the Supreme Court of Ohio had taken a relatively
narrow view of the circumstances in which the transferee of a negotiable instrument could
defeat defenses that would have been good against the transferor. See Riley v. Johnson, 8
Ohio 526, 528-29 (1838). Immediately after the Federal Supreme Court expressed a broader
view in Swift, however, the Ohio court overruled Riley. The Ohio court offered the following
explanation:
It is believed that the law, as ... settled [in Swift] by the highest judicial
tribunal in the country, will become the uniform rule of all, as it now is of most
of the states. And, in a country like ours, where so much communication and
interchange exists between the different members of the confederacy, to
preserve uniformity in the great principles of commercial law, is of much
interest to the mercantile world.
Carlisle v. Wishart, 11 Ohio 172, 191-92 (1842); see also Atkinson v. Brooks, 26 Vt. 569, 581
(1854) (asserting that “the course of decision in the several states since the date of [Swift v.
Tyson] show a general disposition to adopt [Swift’s holding]”); cf. Robinson v. Smith, 14 Cal.
94, 98 (1859) (acknowledging that “[t]here is unquestionably very great conflict in the cases,”
but aligning Swift with “the more modern decisions, especially in new States, not trammeled
or foreclosed by previous adjudications”). But see Roxborough v. Messick, 6 Ohio St. 448, 45658 (1856) (limiting Carlisle and declining to follow what the court characterized as “obiter
dictum of Justice Story”); see also Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill 93 (N.Y. 1843) (declining to
bring New York case law into harmony with Swift v. Tyson).
77. See Hurst, supra note 74, at 705 (studying antebellum case law about commercial
paper and concluding that at least before the Civil War, “state high courts tended to conform
their own rulings to those of the Supreme Court”); see also Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary
Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 504 (1949) (studying a longer period and concluding that the
Federal Supreme Court’s decisions about the content of general law “did promote uniformity
to a substantial degree”). In private correspondence with Judge Friendly, Richard Posner both
echoed this idea and argued that it retains some truth even after Erie. In his view, “pre- and
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II. JUSTICE BRANDEIS’S ARGUMENTS IN ERIE
Federal courts applied the doctrine described in the previous Part
until 1938. In that year, however, Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie
instructed federal judges to follow state-court precedents on all
questions that lie within the states’ legislative competence, even if
those questions would previously have been classified as matters of
“general” law.78 Brandeis left various details to be worked out in
later cases.79 But on the basic issue raised in Erie itself, Brandeis’s
opinion was clear: within the limits of the states’ lawmaking powers,
precedents that a particular state’s highest court had established
and to which it continued to adhere were to have the same status in
federal court as statutes enacted by the state’s legislature.
Justice Brandeis advanced three different categories of arguments for this conclusion. First, he argued that Justice Story’s
opinion in Swift v. Tyson had misinterpreted section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and that the original meaning of the statute
compelled the result in Erie.80 Second, he observed that “the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson” was having bad effects in practice.81
Third, he argued that the course pursued by the federal courts
under Swift was “unconstitutional[ ]” (and, seemingly relatedly, that

post-Erie federal diversity decisions have in fact been a force for bringing about a greater
uniformity in the common law of the states.” William Domnarski, The Correspondence of
Henry Friendly and Richard A. Posner 1982-86, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 395, 404 (2011)
(emphasis added) (quoting letter from Richard Posner to Henry Friendly (Jan. 3, 1983)). I am
indebted to John Harrison for calling my attention to Judge Posner’s observation.
78. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
79. For instance, how should federal courts decide which state’s precedents governed
which questions? See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Did federal
courts owe any deference to the precedents of a state’s intermediate appellate courts on
matters that the state’s supreme court had not yet addressed? See Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 333 U.S. 153,
158 (1948); West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-38 (1940); Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311
U.S. 169, 177-80 (1940). What about precedents that the state’s supreme court had
established, but that it seemed likely to overrule at its next opportunity? See Mason v. Am.
Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 908-10 (1st Cir. 1957) (anticipating that the Supreme
Court of Mississippi would overrule an old precedent, and following the view of state law that
the federal court expected the state supreme court to adopt).
80. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-73.
81. Id. at 73-77.
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it rested on a “fallacy” about the nature of law).82 This Part examines each of those arguments in turn.
A. Justice Brandeis’s Historical Argument
Justice Brandeis opened with an argument about history. As
mentioned above, section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had
specified that “the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases
where they apply.”83 (By the time of Erie, this statutory provision
was known as the “Rules of Decision Act”84 and was found at section
721 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. But section 721 of the Revised
Statutes was substantively identical to section 34 of the original
Judiciary Act, and Justice Brandeis’s opinion therefore referred
throughout to section 34.) In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story had held
that the phrase “laws of the several states” in section 34 covered
(1) written state laws, (2) “long established local customs having the
force of laws,” and perhaps (3) settled precedents of the state courts
about the content of these “local” laws, but not (4) decisions of the
state courts on “questions of a more general nature,” such as
“questions of general commercial law.”85 According to Justice
Brandeis, however, “the more recent research of a competent
scholar” had “established” that “th[is] construction ... was erroneous” and that section 34 had been intended to make federal courts
follow state-court precedents about the “general” aspects of the
state’s unwritten law as well as the “local” aspects.86
The “competent scholar” whom Brandeis cited was Charles
Warren, who had unearthed new information about the drafting
history of section 34.87 Warren had located (“in the attic of the
Capitol”) the original version of the Judiciary Act as introduced in
82. Id. at 77-80.
83. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789).
84. See, e.g., Benno Schmidt, Substantive Law Applied by the Federal Courts—Effect of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 16 TEX. L. REV. 512, 513 (1938).
85. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842).
86. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72-73.
87. See id. at 73 n.5 (citing Warren, supra note 10).
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the Senate, and he had also located (“in a cellar room, under a heap
of miscellaneous papers of confused and intermingled dates and subjects”) a copy of the bill as approved by the Senate and sent to the
House.88 Warren saw that section 34 did not appear in the former
document but did appear in the latter document, meaning that it
was added at some point during the Senate’s consideration of the
bill.89 What is more, Warren found evidence of the amendment that
added it. Among other “odd, loose slips of paper of different sizes
and shapes” that set forth proposed amendments to the judiciary
bill and that had been “preserved in a bundle, in the Senate Files [in
the Capitol’s attic],”90 Warren discovered a sheet—apparently in the
handwriting of Senator Oliver Ellsworth91—setting forth both a
draft of what became section 34 and the edits that produced the
final version. Although some words in the draft are struck out, they
are still legible, and they show that the draft referred to “the
Statute law of the several States in force for the time being and
their unwritten or common law now in use, whether by adoption
from the common law of England, the ancient statutes of the same
or otherwise.”92 Through emendations that appear on the same
sheet, this passage was replaced with the shorter phrase “the laws
of the several States,” yielding the provision that appears as
section 34 of the Judiciary Act. From this progression, Warren
inferred that “the [phrase] ‘laws of the several States’ was intended
to be a concise expression and a summary of the more detailed
enumeration of the different forms of State law, set forth in the
original draft,”93 and hence that section 34 encompassed not only
each state’s “Statute law” but also its “unwritten or common law.”
For Warren, it followed that section 34 dictated the result that
Justice Brandeis would later reach in Erie rather than the result
that Justice Story had reached in Swift v. Tyson. Indeed, Warren
wrote as if this conclusion were obvious: “Had Judge Story seen this

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Warren, supra note 10, at 50 & n.5.
See id. at 81.
Id. at 50 & n.5.
Id. at 85.
See id. at 87 (providing a photostatic copy of this handwritten sheet).
See id. at 86.
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original draft of the amendment, it is almost certain that his
decision would have been the reverse of what it was.”94
Even if one were otherwise to accept Warren’s argument (and, as
we shall see, that would be a serious mistake), the idea that
information about the drafting history of section 34 would have
changed the result in Swift v. Tyson is anachronistic. While the
practice of consulting drafting history in statutory interpretation
had become common by Warren’s day, neither Justice Story nor his
predecessors would have considered it appropriate.95 Indeed, even
modern judges who are sympathetic to this practice96 might resist
invoking the particular type of document unearthed by Warren—a
sheet that (1) was not publicly available for the first 135 years after
the Judiciary Act became law and (2) reflected a drafting change
that might not have been widely known even among members of the
enacting Congress.97
Still, these threshold objections are not themselves fatal to
Warren’s position. Even if the type of drafting history unearthed by
Warren is not something that the early Supreme Court would have
used to interpret early statutes, and even if it also is not the sort of
thing that the modern Supreme Court would use in interpreting
modern statutes, perhaps it is still useful when the modern Court
needs to interpret an early statute—that is, when modern interpret94. Id. at 52.
95. See CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 251-52 (2011) (summarizing the rise
of reliance upon legislative history in American courts, and tracing the Federal Supreme
Court’s use of drafting history to the second half of the nineteenth century); see also, e.g., H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 897
n.60 (1985) (reporting remarks by an early member of Congress to the effect that the journals
of each House, which provide information about drafting history, would not affect the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of a federal statute).
96. Justice Scalia remains opposed. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 668 (2006)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
97. It is entirely possible that most senators voted on the Judiciary Act of 1789 without
ever having seen Senator Ellsworth’s initial draft of section 34. See Warren, supra note 10,
at 86 (asserting that the changes reflected on Senator Ellsworth’s sheet occurred “[b]efore the
Amendment was actually submitted” in the Senate); see also WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE
HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 131 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990) (noting
that even the final version of section 34 does not appear to have been voted upon by the
Senate “individually,” but instead “only as a part of the bill as it finally passed”). In any event,
there is no reason to think that either members of the House of Representatives or President
Washington would have been familiar with this drafting history.
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ers have to try to recreate the understandings of a past world. If
Warren’s arguments were valid, they might shed light on how at
least one distinguished lawyer of the late eighteenth century used
the phrase “laws of the several States.” And unless we have some
reason to think that Senator Ellsworth had a different understanding of that phrase than his contemporaries, perhaps this evidence
sheds light on the original meaning of section 34 after all.98
For the sake of argument, then, let us set aside any objections to
Warren’s willingness to consult drafting history in the first place,
and let us also assume that whatever the drafting history shows
about Senator Ellsworth’s understanding of section 34 can properly
be treated as the original meaning of that provision. Warren’s
argument still has two serious flaws.
The first flaw is well known to modern scholars. The crucial
premise of Warren’s argument is that when Senator Ellsworth or
his colleagues decided to use the phrase “the laws of the several
States” as a substitute for the earlier draft’s reference to “the
Statute law of the several States in force for the time being and
their unwritten or common law now in use,” the change was mostly
stylistic rather than substantive: the shorter phrase was intended
to refer to all the same types of law as the more detailed phrase.99
As modern scholars have pointed out, though, Warren offered no
support for this assumption, and the assumption is not obviously

98. That could be true even though the Supreme Court of the late eighteenth century
would not have considered this sort of information. After all, the early Court might not have
needed any outside help to determine how lawyers of its own era understood the phrase “laws
of the several States”; the Justices were themselves lawyers of that era, and they were
familiar with the legal vocabulary of their day. Modern lawyers trying to understand that
vocabulary might therefore need to use sources that the early Court would not have consulted.
Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 558 n.151
(2003) (explaining why it might sometimes be appropriate for present-day originalists to draw
conclusions about the original meaning of the Constitution on the basis of sources that
eighteenth-century lawyers would not have consulted, and making an analogy to the methods
that federal courts currently use to identify the content of the law of foreign countries).
99. See Warren, supra note 10, at 86, 88. Warren acknowledged that the change was not
purely stylistic, because it dropped the qualifying phrases “in force for the time being” and
“now in use.” See id. at 86 (describing this change as having “removed [a] limitation
[c]ontained in [the] original draft”); cf. 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 867 (1953) (asserting that the phrase
“for the time being” in the draft was a fluctuating reference to the time of suit, but that the
word “now” would have referred forever afterward to 1789).
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correct.100 After all, legal draftsmen often change the language of a
bill in order to alter its meaning, not to keep its meaning the same.
Suppose, however, we could somehow know that Senator
Ellsworth’s changes were indeed primarily stylistic. There is still a
second major flaw with Warren’s argument—one that is less
familiar to modern scholars than the first flaw, but more devastating. Suppose that section 34 had explicitly said what Warren took
it to mean: “the Statute law of the several States ... and their
unwritten or common law ... shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases
where they apply” (except where the Federal Constitution, federal
treaties, or federal statutes shall otherwise require or provide).
Warren’s conclusion still would not follow. In 1789, people did not
automatically treat the phrase “unwritten or common law” as a
synonym for “judicial decisions.”101 Thus, even if section 34 had
explicitly instructed federal courts to draw rules of decision from the
“unwritten or common law” in use in each state, section 34 would
not necessarily have been ordering federal courts to accept statecourt precedents about the content of the unwritten or common law.
Instead, lawyers of the day could have read section 34 in the same
way that Chancellor Taylor read the ordinance specifying that “the
common law of England ... shall be the rule of decision” in Virginia:
even if section 34 adopted the common law in use in each state, it
did not necessarily adopt the decisions of each state’s highest

100. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious: Erie as the Worst
Decision of All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 134 (2011) (“In the absence of any further evidence
... there is no way to determine whether the change ... was or was not intended to change the
substantive meaning of the statute.”).
Warren based his diagnosis of a stylistic change largely on a single fact: in addition to
dropping the draft’s reference to the “unwritten or common law” of the several states,
Ellsworth also struck the word “Statute,” so that section 34 referred to “the laws of the several
States” rather than simply “the Statute law of the several States.” Warren, supra note 10, at
86. As Warren argued, this change suggests that Ellsworth understood the final version of
section 34 to cover more than just statutes. But it does not prove that Ellsworth intended the
phrase “laws of the several States” to refer to all the same types of law as the earlier draft.
He could have believed that the phrase “laws of the several States” covered not only state
statutes but also state constitutions and even “strictly local” aspects of the unwritten law
(such as “long established local customs having the force of laws”), without believing that it
also covered the more “general” aspects of the unwritten law. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
101. See supra Part I.B.1.
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court.102 More generally, section 34 need not be read to address the
deference that federal courts owe to the decisions of each state’s
highest court about the content of any of the sources of law that
section 34 invokes.103
Contrary to Justice Brandeis’s claims, then, the drafting history
uncovered by Charles Warren failed to show that Swift v. Tyson was
“erroneous” as a historical matter, or that the original meaning of
section 34 supported the result in Erie rather than the result in
Swift. Modern scholars with an interest in history now generally
agree that Warren’s discovery was “inconclusive[ ].”104
The late Professor Wilfred J. Ritz would have taken this revisionism even farther: in his view, not only was Erie wrong about the
102. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
103. For an interesting counterpoint to section 34 that highlights the contrast between the
sources of law that are regarded as rules of decision and state-court precedents about the
content of those sources of law, consider the parallel provision in the Judiciary Act that the
Provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America enacted in March 1861, after the
purported secession of seven states from the Union. That provision read as follows:
The laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes
of the Confederate States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in the courts of the Confederate States, in cases where they
apply. And where the decision of the highest court in a state has become a rule
of property, the same shall be adopted as a rule in the courts of the Confederate
States, in cases in which the laws of such state apply.
Act of Mar. 16, 1861, ch. 61, § 13, in THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE PROVISIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 75, 77 (James M. Matthews ed.,
1864). This provision is interesting for two reasons. First, the contrast between the first and
second sentences strongly suggests that a provision requiring courts to treat “[t]he laws of the
several states” as rules of decision was not itself understood to address the deference that
courts owed to “the decision of the highest court in a state” about their content. Second, the
fact that the second sentence was limited to decisions that had become “rule[s] of property”
suggests that the courts of the Confederate States were not otherwise bound to accept what
the highest court of any individual state said about the content of the laws in force in that
state. Cf. Charles Fairman, Book Review, 55 HARV. L. REV. 172, 174 (1941) (reviewing
WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JR., JUSTICE IN GREY: A HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA (1941)) (observing that this sentence, “by clear implication,
conceded the ground seized for the federal judiciary in Swift v. Tyson”).
104. FREYER, supra note 11, at 112-13; see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope
of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 903-04 (1986) (describing Warren’s argument
as “shaky”); G. Edward White, A Customary International Law of Torts, 41 VAL. U. L. REV.
755, 792-93 (2006) (calling Justice Brandeis’s historical argument “defective” and observing
that Justice Story’s reading of section 34 “was consistent with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in common law cases prior to Swift”); cf. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of
Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 389-90 (1964) (supporting
Erie for other reasons, but conceding that the historical argument is at best inconclusive).
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original meaning of section 34, but even Swift may have yoked the
federal courts too closely to the local law of individual states. Ritz
began by observing that eighteenth-century legal draftsmen,
including those responsible for the Judiciary Act of 1789, often used
the phrase “the several states” to refer to “the states as a group”
rather than to each state individually.105 To convey the latter idea,
Ritz argued, draftsmen preferred to use the phrase “the respective
states” or “the states respectively.”106 Although Ritz acknowledged
that this usage was not a “hard-and-fast rule,”107 he believed that
section 34 reflected it: according to Ritz, when section 34 told federal
courts to regard “the laws of the several states” as rules of decision,
it was referring to “American law generally” rather than “the law of
a particular state.”108 Ritz concluded that section 34 had not been
intended to require federal courts to apply even the statutory law of
any individual state (pace Justice Story’s opinion in Swift), let alone
what the courts of any individual state had said about the unwritten
law of that state (pace Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie).109 For
other reasons, Ritz himself believed that section 34 was probably
intended to address only criminal trials at common law and to have
no bearing on civil cases.110 But if section 34 did reach civil cases,
Ritz took it to be an instruction to apply “the ‘laws of the several
states’ viewed as a group of eleven states in 1789, and not viewed
separately and individually.”111
105. RITZ, supra note 97, at 83.
106. Id. at 83-87.
107. Id. at 83.
108. Id. at 140-41; see also id. at 140 (asserting that if the point of section 34 had been to
make federal courts apply the laws of individual states, “the word used almost certainly
would have been ‘respective’ and not ‘several’”).
109. Id. at 148, 157-59.
110. See id. at 147 (finding it significant that section 34 came immediately after section 33,
“which relates exclusively to criminal law matters”); id. at 146 (speculating that section 34
was “probably” intended to direct the federal courts to “apply an American common law of
crimes, as opposed to the British criminal common law, until Congress could get around to
passage of a code of national crimes”). But see id. at 149 (conceding that if section 34 was
indeed “a temporary gap-filling measure” of this sort, then Congress should have repealed it
after enacting the Crimes Act of 1790—which Congress did not do); see also United States v.
Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 362-63 (1852) (reading section 34 to apply only in “civil cases at
common law” and not in “trials for offences against the United States”—a conclusion that is
precisely the opposite of Ritz’s). Ritz’s arguments for confining section 34 to criminal trials are
idiosyncratic, and this aspect of his book has not attracted much of a following.
111. RITZ, supra note 97, at 148.
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A number of distinguished modern scholars have accepted Ritz’s
view about the meaning of the phrase “the several states” in section
34.112 But the evidence does not really bear out that view. Even
today, the adjective “several” can be used to refer serially to each
discrete unit in a composite group. (Think of what it means to say
that all the defendants in a civil case are being held liable not only
“jointly” but also “severally.”) This usage dates far back in American
law,113 and the First Congress often applied it to states—as when
Congress resolved that the Secretary of State should “procure from
time to time such of the statutes of the several states as may not be
in his office,”114 or when Congress appropriated money “[f]or paying
salaries to the late loan-officers of the several states,”115 or when
Congress referred to “the requisitions heretofore made upon the
several states.”116 The Constitution itself used the same locution
when it provided that “[t]he House of Representatives shall be
112. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal
Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 81, 105-10 (1993)
(accepting the idea that “the term ‘several states’ connoted the states collectively” and that
“Congress did not understand Section 34 as a command to apply the substantive law of any
particular state”); Sherry, supra note 100, at 134-35 (arguing on the basis of Ritz’s research
that “the enacting Congress probably did not intend for federal courts sitting in diversity to
apply either state statutory law or state common law, but rather to apply federal common
law”).
113. The first good American law dictionary, originally published in 1839, noted that
“several” conveyed a sense of “separation or partition” and offered the following examples:
A several agreement or covenant, is one entered into by two or more persons
separately, each binding himself for the whole; a several action is one in which
two or more persons are separately charged; a several inheritance, is one
conveyed so as to descend, or come to two persons separately by moieties.
2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 504-05 (2d
ed. 1843). This usage was common in the eighteenth century as well as the nineteenth. See
15 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 97 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that when “several” qualifies
a plural noun, it can mean “[i]ndividually separate,” and offering examples from the fifteenth
through the nineteenth centuries).
114. Res. of Sept. 23, 1789, 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 97.
115. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 4, § 5, 1 Stat. 104, 105.
116. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95; see also, e.g., Act of Aug. 11, 1790, ch. 43, 1
Stat. 184, 184-85 (consenting to tonnage duties imposed by “the acts of the several states
herein after mentioned,” and proceeding to list statutes from Rhode Island, Maryland, and
Georgia); Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, § 3, 1 Stat. 138, 139 (referring to certificates “issued by
the commissioners of loans in the several states”); Res. of Sept. 23, 1789, 1st Cong., 1 Stat. 96
(resolving “[t]hat it be recommended to the legislatures of the several States to pass laws” of
a certain description).
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composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the
several States.”117 Just as the phrase “the People of the several
States” in this provision refers to the people of each state individually rather than the people of the states as an undifferentiated
mass, the standard reading of section 34 takes the phrase “the laws
of the several states” to refer to the law of each state individually.
Not only is that reading consistent with the drafting habits of the
late eighteenth century, but I am not aware of any persuasive
evidence that Ritz’s contrary reading of section 34 even occurred to
a single lawyer or judge in the early Republic. By contrast, there is
clear evidence of lawyers and judges adopting the standard
reading.118
But while I think we can safely conclude that Ritz was wrong
about the original meaning of section 34, that conclusion does
nothing to rehabilitate Justice Brandeis’s historical argument in
Erie. Even though section 34 is naturally understood to refer to the
laws of each state individually, and even though that reference can
readily be understood to include unwritten as well as written forms
of law, section 34 still need not be interpreted to address whether
federal courts must defer to each state’s highest court about the
content of the unwritten law in force within that state. At any rate,
the drafting history unearthed by Charles Warren has no real
bearing on this point: it does not establish—or even suggest—that
the original meaning of section 34 foreclosed Justice Story’s position
in Swift.

117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. I would say the same about the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, which reads as follows: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” Id. art. IV, § 2; see also John
Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1400-01
(1992) (observing that under what appears to have been the “mainstream interpretation” of
this provision, the clause required each state to accord traveling citizens from other states the
same privileges and immunities that the state accorded its own citizens). But see RITZ, supra
note 97, at 85 (interpreting this clause to refer to “the privileges and immunities ... that are
common ... to all the states”).
118. See Collins, supra note 24, at 171-72 (noting that Justice Iredell’s opinion in United
States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23 (C.C.D. Va. 1795) (No. 15,834), which discusses section 34 in
detail, takes for granted that section 34 requires reference to the law of particular states).
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B. Justice Brandeis’s Practical Arguments
Aside from making a specious historical argument, Justice
Brandeis also offered practical reasons to dislike the doctrine
associated with Swift. Here, he was on somewhat sounder ground,
although he overstated his case and ignored plausible counterarguments.
1. The Murkiness of the Distinction Between “General” and
“Local” Law
To begin with, Justice Brandeis observed that “the distinction
between questions of general and of local law,” which was central to
the Swift regime, had proved both arbitrary and murky: no natural
“line of demarcation” separated the two types of questions, and the
federal courts’ efforts at classification had introduced a “well of
uncertainties.”119 That is true. But as students of civil procedure can
confirm, Erie has not eliminated all line-drawing problems.
According to Suzanna Sherry, indeed, Erie “simply traded one set of
uncertainties for another,” because it requires federal courts to draw
equally murky distinctions between “substantive” questions (which
Erie potentially instructs federal courts to answer in accord with the
precedents of a particular state’s supreme court) and “procedural”
questions (which, in federal court, are instead governed by some
form of federal law).120
Evaluating Professor Sherry’s specific argument about the
distinction between “substance” and “procedure” is harder than one
might think, because federal courts had to draw that distinction
even before Erie. One of the main reasons why they needed to do so,
however, was a federal statute called the Conformity Act,121 which
119. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 & n.8 (1938).
120. Sherry, supra note 100, at 141-42.
121. See Rev. Stat. § 914 (1874) (“The practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding in civil causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit and district
courts, shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State within which
such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding.”);
see also Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (enacting the original version of this
statute). By virtue of this statute, federal courts entertaining actions at law before Erie often
had to determine whether a particular question was about “practice ... [or] modes of
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was largely superseded in September 1938 and completely repealed
in 1948.122 Given the demise of the Conformity Act, modern federal
courts may indeed have to distinguish “substance” from “procedure”
somewhat more often because they follow Erie than would be
necessary if they still followed Swift.123 But to the extent that this
proceeding” (in which case the Conformity Act might tell them to follow the practice of the
courts of an individual state) or was instead more substantive (in which case they might
follow their own understanding of the “general” law unless they classified the question as one
of “local” law).
Before Congress enacted the Conformity Act in 1872, federal courts had to draw a similar
distinction under the so-called Process Acts. See Act of Aug. 1, 1842, ch. 109, 5 Stat. 499; Act
of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275; Act of Sept. 29,
1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93. Although the Process Acts were understood to call for “static”
conformity (with the forms of proceeding that the relevant state had been using in either 1828
or 1789) rather than “dynamic” conformity (with whatever practices the state courts used at
the time of suit), they too often required federal courts to treat procedure differently than
substance. See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 61 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing both the Process Acts and the Conformity Act).
122. The process of superseding the Conformity Act began in 1934, when Congress
authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate “general rules” prescribing “the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law” in the federal district courts. Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651,
§ 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (1934); see also id. § 2 (adding that the Supreme Court “may at any
time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law
so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both”). Congress specified that rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to this authority “shall take effect six months
after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further
force or effect.” Id. § 1.
By the time that Erie was decided in April 1938, the Supreme Court had used this
authority to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but those rules had not yet
taken effect. When they did so in September 1938, they superseded the Conformity Act at
least with respect to the topics that they covered, but the Conformity Act arguably remained
in force with respect to other topics. See Young v. Garrett, 149 F.2d 223, 227 (8th Cir. 1945)
(“Where there are no specific national statutes ... or governing Rules, the Conformity Act ...
applies and State law controls.”); see also Thomas F. Green, Jr., The Admissibility of Evidence
Under the Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REV. 197, 204 (1941) (discussing the status of the
Conformity Act after the effective date of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). In 1948,
Congress finally repealed the Conformity Act in its entirety. See Act of June 25, 1948, § 39,
62 Stat. 869, 992-93 (repealing Rev. Stat. § 914).
123. The difference between Swift and Erie does not affect how federal courts behave with
respect to matters covered by written federal law. For instance, consider matters covered by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With or without Erie, federal courts would have to follow
all valid aspects of the Federal Rules, and they would also have to use the same test to
determine the validity of those Rules. That test, which is supplied by the Rules Enabling Act,
does require federal courts to draw some distinctions between “procedure” and “substance.”
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (delegating authority to prescribe “general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence”); id. § 2072(b) (adding that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right”). But that would be true even if federal courts were
still operating under Swift, as they were when Congress initially supplied this test in 1934.
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conclusion depends on legal changes that occurred after Erie (such
as the repeal of the Conformity Act in 1948), blaming Justice
Brandeis for it may be unfair.
Even apart from the distinction between “substance” and “procedure,” though, there is a different reason why Professor Sherry is
Just as the difference between Swift and Erie does not affect how federal courts handle
matters that are covered by written federal law, so too it does not dramatically affect how
federal courts handle matters that are covered by written state law (or other types of state
law that would have been classified as “local” under Swift). At any rate, the difference
between Swift and Erie does not affect the need for modern federal courts to classify such
matters as “substantive” or “procedural.” To appreciate this point, suppose that a federal court
is confronting a question that written federal law does not address and that a state statute
would govern if the case were in state court. If the federal court classifies the question as
“substantive,” then the Rules of Decision Act will lead the federal court too to follow the state
statute (assuming that the applicable conflict-of-law principles favor using this particular
state’s law). Even during the Swift era, though, courts and commentators recognized a
category of “procedural” questions that state law does not govern of its own force in federal
court. See, e.g., BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 218 (George Ticknor Curtis &
Benjamin R. Curtis eds., 1880) (“[T]he State legislatures have not, under the Constitution of
the United States, any power to legislate respecting the practice, pleading, and modes of
proceeding of the courts of the United States.”); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, The
Article III Jury, 87 VA. L. REV. 587, 609 (2001) (“According to the Supreme Court, under the
Process Acts, state procedures did not operate of their own force in federal courts, but rather
because they had been adopted by Congress.”). Now that the Conformity Act no longer exists,
federal law leaves federal courts free to follow their own customary practices on such
questions. As a result, even if modern federal courts still accepted Swift, they would apply
state statutes and other aspects of local state law to “substantive” questions that lie within
the states’ legislative competence, but not to questions that the federal courts classify as
“procedural.” What is more, federal courts probably would draw the line between “substance”
and “procedure” for this purpose in exactly the same place that they have drawn it for
purposes of Erie analysis. (After all, the reason why Erie does not oblige federal courts to
follow state law on “procedural” matters, including even matters that written federal law does
not address, is that the Constitution puts those matters beyond the states’ power to regulate
in federal court. That is precisely the logic that federal courts would be likely to use if they
still accepted Swift but were no longer subject to the Conformity Act.)
With respect to matters that are not covered either by any written federal law or by any
written state law, however, the difference between Swift and Erie may well affect the
frequency with which modern federal courts have to distinguish “substance” from “procedure.”
Insofar as some such matter comes within the states’ legislative competence, in the sense that
a state court handling the matter would be thought of as applying state law, Erie tells federal
courts to ask whether the matter is “substantive” (in which case they should handle the
matter as the state court would) or “procedural” (in which case they can handle the matter
according to the customary practices of the federal courts). By contrast, if modern federal
courts still accepted Swift, and if they classified the matter as one of “general” law, they might
not need to worry about whether the matter is “substantive” or “procedural”; either way, they
would handle it according to their own best understanding of the unwritten law.
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correct that Erie “traded one set of uncertainties for another.”124 In
fields over which the states enjoy legislative jurisdiction, Erie did
eliminate the need for federal courts to separate questions of
“general” law from questions of “local” law. But wherever federal
courts following Swift would have characterized a question in one
of those fields as “general” (and hence not controlled by the decisional law of any individual state), federal courts now have to
identify the particular state whose decisional law matters. As a
result, federal courts following Erie face horizontal conflict-of-law
questions substantially more often than they did under Swift—and
the lines that conflict-of-law analysis requires courts to draw may
be just as murky as the line between “local” and “general” law.125
At first glance, the Supreme Court’s 1941 decision in Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.126 might seem to mitigate this
problem. In one sense, after all, Klaxon established a clear rule: in
cases covered by Klaxon, each federal district court is supposed to
borrow the conflict-of-law doctrines that would be used by the
highest court of the state in which it sits.127 But unless that state
has achieved clarity in conflict-of-law analysis, this approach does
not eliminate the need for federal courts to draw murky lines; it
simply tells federal courts to try to apply the same murky lines that
the state courts would use. This instruction, moreover, has its own
costs. Indeed, it arguably destroys one of the principal practical
advantages that the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts used
to serve.128
124. See supra text accompanying note 120.
125. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal
Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 12 (1991) (“In the states that have adopted one of the
modern choice of law approaches, the parties may litigate at length over the application of
indeterminate criteria.”).
126. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
127. Id. at 496-97.
128. In the old days, when federal courts faced questions of “local” law and had to decide
which state’s local law to use, they applied their own understanding of conflict-of-law
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ex parte Heidelback, 11 F. Cas. 1021, 1022 (D.C.D. Mass. 1876) (No.
6322) (“When we have ascertained what local law applies to the case, we follow it; but the
ascertainment itself is not a local question.”). Professor McConnell has powerfully explained
the practical benefits of this approach. See Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach
to Products-Liability Reform, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 90, 91-97 (Walter Olson
ed., 1988); see also Nelson, supra note 28, at 566-67 (summarizing McConnell’s argument and
concluding that “[l]argely because of Klaxon, diversity jurisdiction no longer checks states’
tendencies to favor in-state interests by extending the reach of certain laws beyond [the limits
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2. Disuniformity and Forum Shopping
Aside from the line-drawing necessitated by Swift, Justice
Brandeis also pointed to a more serious problem. As Part I suggested, people of Justice Story’s day may well have hoped that the
practice reflected in Swift would promote national uniformity on
questions of general law; although the courts of individual states
were not bound to accept what the Federal Supreme Court said
about the content of the general law, people hoped that they would
usually choose to do so (either because they found the Supreme
Court’s opinions persuasive or simply because those opinions
provided a natural coordination point).129 According to Justice
Brandeis, however, this hope had not been realized, or had been
realized only very imperfectly: state courts often “[p]ersist[ed] ... in
their own opinions on questions of common law.”130 In at least some
states, then, the state courts applied different rules of decision than
the federal courts on some questions of general law. The result was
that “[i]n attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the
United States, the doctrine [associated with Swift] ... prevented
uniformity in the administration of the law of the State.”131
This disuniformity had various bad consequences. Justice
Brandeis himself emphasized the incentives that it created for what
is now called “forum shopping”: lawyers contemplating litigation on
behalf of a client sometimes knew that a state court would take a
different view of the applicable law than a federal court located in
the same state, and they sometimes could maneuver their client’s
case into the court whose view favored their side.132 But forum
suggested by traditional conflict-of-law principles]”).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
130. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 & n.7 (1938).
131. Id. at 75.
132. See id. at 74-75 (discussing the importance under Swift of “the privilege of selecting
the court”). For Justice Brandeis and other critics of Swift, the leading example of
manipulative forum shopping was Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). At the time of that case, federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction effectively treated every domestic corporation as a citizen of whichever
state had incorporated it. A taxicab company that did business in Kentucky, and that wanted
to sue a local competitor on a matter as to which the federal courts and the Kentucky courts
had different understandings of the unwritten law, therefore reincorporated itself in
Tennessee so as to be able to bring its suit in federal court. This stratagem worked, though
it produced a famous dissent by Justice Holmes and provided extra ammunition for attacks
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shopping was an artifact of a more fundamental problem that had
bad effects at an even earlier stage. In Henry Hart’s words, the
arrangements reflected in Swift “subject[ed] citizens at the crucial
level of everyday activity to dual and often inconsistent systems of
substantive law, without means of foretelling which system, in the
unforeseeable contingency of litigation, was going to apply.”133 If
state and federal courts have different understandings of the legal
rights and duties associated with conduct in the real world, and if
someone who might engage in that conduct cannot know in advance
which court system will adjudicate any lawsuits arising from his
conduct, the resulting uncertainties may well produce both inefficiencies and injustices.134
Still, as various scholars have explained, when we consider
whether Erie is better than Swift in this respect, we need to keep in
mind two different sorts of uniformity (and two different sorts of
disuniformity).135 Swift offered the prospect of uniformity on
on the Swift regime. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-74 & n.6 (noting that “[c]riticism of the [Swift]
doctrine became widespread” after the taxicab case); see also, e.g., Felix Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499,
527-28 (1928) (using the taxicab case as the lead example of Swift’s bad effects).
There is no doubt that the taxicab case reflected an unattractive manipulation of diversity
jurisdiction and that the Swift regime had provided the incentive for this manipulation. But
instead of concluding that the Swift regime should be abandoned, one could simply have
concluded that Congress should make the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction less
manipulable. After all, if courts determine the citizenship of corporations for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction by focusing solely on the state of incorporation, they are practically
inviting the sort of manipulation that occurred in the taxicab case, because corporations often
can choose their state of incorporation without substantial cost. Had Congress been concerned
about this problem enough to want to reduce it, Congress could have overridden the thenexisting judicial doctrine about corporate citizenship and established a test with more
connection to the real world—as Congress eventually did even after Erie. See Act of July 25,
1958, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (specifying that for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441, a
corporation should be deemed to be a citizen not only of “any State by which it has been
incorporated” but also of “the State where it has its principal place of business”) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1195 (2010)
(noting that “a major reason for the insertion of the ‘principal place of business’ language in
the diversity statute” was to impede “jurisdictional manipulation”).
133. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 505 (1954).
134. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Erie
recognized that there should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary
activity of citizens, for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give rise to a
debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs.”).
135. See, e.g., Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in Its Place: Stare Decisis and
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questions of general law across all federal courts throughout the
country: once the United States Supreme Court had addressed and
resolved a question of general law, all other federal courts were
supposed to accept and apply its view.136 But Swift achieved this
“horizontal” uniformity among federal courts at the expense of
“vertical” uniformity between the state and federal courts located in
a particular state. To be sure, Swift did not sacrifice the latter sort
of uniformity completely; the courts of many states might share the
Federal Supreme Court’s understanding of the general law, whether
because (1) they independently arrived at the same conclusion,
(2) they found the Supreme Court’s opinions persuasive, or (3) they
opted to defer to those opinions for the sake of uniformity. On
contested questions of general law, though, the courts of some states
could be expected to disagree with the Federal Supreme Court (or
with the lower federal courts on issues that the Supreme Court had
Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 980 n.60 (1996) (“Erie sacrificed
horizontal uniformity among different courts in the federal system in favor of vertical
uniformity between federal and state courts in the same state.”); Sherry, supra note 100, at
138-39, 141 (casting the point in terms of forum shopping); cf. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 715 n.125 (1974) (agreeing that “a choice between
horizontal uniformity among all federal courts and vertical uniformity between the federal
and state courts of a given state ... was at the heart of the disagreement between Swift and
Erie,” but asserting—erroneously, in my view—that the Rules of Decision Act compels the
choice that Erie made).
136. Because of changes in the nature of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, the Swift regime
may have done more to promote this sort of uniformity in the nineteenth century than in the
years immediately before Erie. Until 1891, the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction was
mandatory: the Court could not pick and choose which appeals to hear. Starting in 1891,
though, Congress began allowing the Court to proceed instead through the discretionary writ
of certiorari in certain kinds of cases, including cases that were properly in the new federal
circuit courts of appeals but that did not involve questions of federal law. See Evarts Act, ch.
517, § 6, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some
Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1649-704
(2000) (discussing the progression of certiorari from the Evarts Act to the so-called “Judges’
Bill” of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936). According to contemporary observers, the result of this
shift toward discretionary jurisdiction was that “relatively few cases where rights under the
Federal Constitution and statutes are not involved are likely to get beyond the Circuit Courts
of Appeals.” Cole v. Pa. R.R. Co., 43 F.2d 953, 957 (2d Cir. 1930). To the extent that the
Supreme Court chose to concentrate on resolving questions of federal law, as opposed to
promoting uniformity in the federal courts’ understanding of the nonfederal general law, the
rise of discretionary jurisdiction arguably undercut one of the possible advantages of the Swift
regime. See id. at 956-57 (emphasizing this point in the course of attacking Swift); cf. Erie, 304
U.S. at 74 n.7 (citing Cole for the proposition that “decisions of this Court on common law
questions are less likely than formerly to promote uniformity”).
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not addressed), and in those states the Swift regime tolerated
vertical disuniformity between the rule of decision in state court and
the rule of decision in federal court.
Together, Erie and Klaxon offer the prospect of more vertical
uniformity between state and federal courts located in the same
state. But Erie does so at the cost of some horizontal uniformity: on
various substantive questions that would previously have been
classified as matters of general law but over which the states have
lawmaking power, different federal district courts now feel bound by
the precedents of the supreme courts of different states.137
Two stylized diagrams help to convey the different types of
uniformity that Swift and Erie promise. Each column in the
diagrams represents the federal and state courts located in a
particular state, and the ovals linking different courts reflect the
relevant type of uniformity. The horizontal uniformity promoted by
Swift (with respect to questions of general law that the Federal
Supreme Court had definitively addressed) might be represented as
follows:
Federal1

Federal2

Federal3

...

Federal48

State1

State2

State3

...

State48

Likewise, the vertical uniformity promoted by Erie and Klaxon (with
respect to questions that the supreme court of each state has
definitively addressed) can be represented as follows:

Federal1

Federal2

Federal3

...

Federal50

State1

State2

State3

...

State50

Insofar as we are trying either (1) to enable real-world actors to
have advance notice of the legal rules that will be applied to their
137. Cf. Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady
Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 32 (2010) (“[T]he Erie-and-Klaxon doctrine’s suppression of
vertical forum shopping encourages the horizontal variety.”).

968

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:921

actions in the event of litigation or (2) to reduce lawyers’ incentives
for forum shopping once litigation is at hand, we might well want to
promote both Swift’s horizontal uniformity throughout all federal
courts and Erie’s vertical uniformity throughout the courts located
in any particular state. Unless all courts across the country are
willing to take the same view of the common law, however, it is
impossible to achieve both types of uniformity simultaneously. As
a result, whether federal courts follow Swift or Erie, there is bound
to be some sort of disuniformity that makes planning harder ex ante
and that creates incentives for forum shopping ex post.
One might think that those problems would be worse under Swift
than under Erie. But to the extent that state courts ever deferred to
federal courts on questions of general law (or were persuaded by the
federal courts’ independent judgment on those questions), the
arrangements reflected in Swift may have done something to
promote vertical uniformity at the same time that they achieved
horizontal uniformity.138 In any event, some kinds of real-world
actors might well have found the horizontal uniformity produced by
Swift more conducive to planning than the vertical uniformity
produced by Erie. Imagine a company that does business in many
different states and that might be sued in any of them. Insofar as
the company could count on being able to remove most suits to
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship,139 Swift offered
some predictability: no matter where the company was sued, it was
likely to be able to get the suit into federal court, where the federal
courts’ (horizontally uniform) understanding of the general law
would apply. Under Erie and Klaxon, by contrast, removing a suit
from state to federal court no longer suppresses horizontal variations in the state courts’ understanding of either conflict-of-law
principles or substantive rules of decision. As a result, businesses
cannot know the rules of decision that will be applied to their
conduct until they know the particular state in which they will be

138. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
139. Admittedly, removability might have been a safer bet in the early days of the Swift
regime than by the end. As states liberalized their rules about the joinder of parties in actions
at common law, they made it easier for plaintiffs to include nondiverse parties whose presence
would defeat removal. Cf. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 1651 (3d ed. 2001) (describing history of permissive joinder).
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sued—information that they might not have at the time that they
need to act.140
In the decades after Erie, moreover, this sort of uncertainty has
arguably increased. When Erie was decided, Pennoyer v. Neff141 had
not yet given way to International Shoe Co. v. Washington,142 and so
the Constitution was still thought to impose substantial restrictions
on each state’s ability to assert personal jurisdiction over out-ofstate defendants who had not appointed an agent for service of
process within the state. With the relaxation of those restrictions,
potential defendants now face a broader array of states in which
they might be sued in connection with any particular transaction.143
Because of the “choice-of-law revolution” that began gathering
steam in the 1960s, moreover, the courts of those different states
are more likely to reach different conclusions about which state’s
law governs which issues.144 While Justice Brandeis could not
necessarily have foreseen these developments, they exacerbate the
type of uncertainty tolerated by Erie and Klaxon.
I do not want to overstate this argument. Even if Erie had never
overruled Swift, state courts located in different states would still
sometimes take different views of the common law, and the
resulting disuniformity would create some problems for potential
litigants who do not know in advance where they will sue or be
sued. To be sure, Erie and Klaxon mean that removing a suit from
140. In contractual settings, businesses can try to mitigate this problem by insisting upon
choice-of-forum or choice-of-law clauses. But tort suits often do not lend themselves to this
solution.
141. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
142. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
143. See, e.g., Hans Smit, Federalizing International Civil Litigation in the United States:
A Modest Proposal, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 60 (1998) (suggesting that this
development provides good reason to overrule Erie, and observing that the combined effect
of modern long-arm statutes and modern conflict-of-law doctrines “permits horizontal forum
shopping on a scale that veritably dwarfs the vertical forum shopping that Justice Brandeis
ruled an undesirable consequence of Swift v. Tyson”); see also MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE UPSIDEDOWN CONSTITUTION 234 (2012) (similarly condemning the interaction between Erie and
International Shoe).
144. See Borchers, supra note 137, at 30-32 (noting that the “unravel[ing]” of the traditional
consensus about conflicts rules has made “horizontal ... forum shopping” a more serious
problem than it used to be, and observing that Erie and Klaxon contribute to that problem);
see also SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT
AND FUTURE (2006) (chronicling the breakdown of consensus in the United States about
conflict-of-law questions).
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state to federal court will no longer tend to dampen the problems
generated by this sort of disuniformity. But it is certainly possible
that the sort of disuniformity tolerated by Erie and Klaxon (involving the rules of decision that federal courts located in different
states would apply to a particular suit) is less troublesome than the
sort of disuniformity tolerated by Swift (involving the rules of
decision that state and federal courts located in the same state
would apply to the suit). What is more, the type of uniformity
promoted by Swift may be harder to achieve now than it was in the
nineteenth century.145
Contrary to Justice Brandeis’s rhetoric, though, Erie cannot rest
on a simple condemnation of disuniformity (or forum shopping),
because some sort of disuniformity (and some sort of forum shopping) is inevitable whether federal courts apply Erie or Swift. To
establish that concerns about disuniformity justify replacing Swift
with Erie, one would need to show that vertical disuniformity
between state and federal courts located in the same state poses
more practical problems than horizontal disuniformity between
federal courts located in one state and federal courts located in
another state. Indeed, even that showing would not be enough:
achieving vertical uniformity between state and federal courts
located in the same state requires Klaxon as well as Erie, and so one
would need to show that the benefits of this sort of uniformity are
large enough to justify the collateral damage that Klaxon inflicts
upon our federal system.146 Neither Justice Brandeis’s opinion in
Erie nor Justice Reed’s opinion in Klaxon took up those challenges.
3. “Discrimination” Against Citizens of the Forum State
In addition to launching a general attack on the disuniformity
associated with Swift, Justice Brandeis also complained about one
of the specific consequences of that disuniformity. In his view, Swift
“introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens [of a state] against
citizens [of the state].”147 Under Swift, he explained, rights varied
“according to whether enforcement was sought in the state or in the
145. See supra notes 136, 139.
146. See supra note 128. For a forceful argument that the net effects of Erie and Klaxon
may be negative, see GREVE, supra note 143, at 221-42.
147. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).

2013]

A CRITICAL GUIDE TO ERIE RAILROAD CO. v. TOMPKINS

971

federal court,” and the noncitizen had “the privilege of selecting the
court.”148 According to Justice Brandeis, indeed, this arrangement
offended the concept of “equal protection of the law.”149
Justice Brandeis did not make explicit exactly what he was
talking about; when a noncitizen of the forum state had a dispute
with a citizen of the forum state, in what sense did the law give the
noncitizen more say than the citizen over whether the suit proceeded in state court or federal court? In the first instance, whoever
was the plaintiff could certainly choose whether to file the suit in
state or federal court. If the plaintiff chose to file in federal court,
moreover, there was no way for the defendant to get the suit
transferred to state court. But that was true regardless of which
party was a citizen of the forum state. Instead of giving noncitizens
a special advantage over citizens, this feature of the system simply
gave plaintiffs an advantage over defendants.150
The “discrimination” that Justice Brandeis had in mind applied
to the subset of cases that the plaintiff chose to file in state court. By
statute, Congress had authorized defendants to remove cases from
state to federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, but only
if the forum state was not the home of any of the defendants.151
Thus, if a citizen of the forum state sued a noncitizen defendant in
state court, the defendant could remove the case to federal court.
But if the roles were reversed, so that a noncitizen plaintiff was
proceeding in state court against a citizen defendant, the case would
remain in state court; the defendant would not have the option of
removal, because Congress had not authorized citizens of the forum
state to remove cases on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
This statutory restriction on removal did indeed give noncitizens
of the forum state somewhat more power than citizens to determine
whether a diversity suit proceeded in state or federal court. But
Justice Brandeis’s argument was nonetheless highly misleading.
148. Id. at 74-75.
149. Id. at 75.
150. See White, supra note 104, at 794.
151. See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, § 28, 36 Stat. 1087, 1094 (authorizing removal on
the basis of diversity of citizenship only if the defendants are “nonresidents of [the forum]
State”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (Supp. V 2011) (setting forth the current version of this
restriction); cf. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (authorizing removal “if a suit
be commenced in any state court ... by a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought
against a citizen of another state”).
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First, as Professor Purcell has noted, Justice Brandeis’s statement
was “obviously inaccurate” as a general matter; the asymmetry that
he had in mind “applied only in a specific subcategory of cases,”
where the plaintiff wanted to proceed in state rather than federal
court and the defendant was contemplating removal.152 Second, the
asymmetry was a product of Congress’s own statutes, not the Swift
regime. While the Swift regime did add to the practical importance
of the asymmetry, Swift certainly did not create the asymmetry—and if Congress had agreed with Justice Brandeis’s fears about
“discrimination,” Congress could have eliminated the problem
simply by repealing the statutory restriction on removal.153
If one treats Justice Brandeis’s invocation of “equal protection” as
an argument about constitutional law, then the fact that the key
distinction originated with Congress might be irrelevant; perhaps
Congress lacked the constitutional authority to draw distinctions
between citizens and noncitizens of the forum state, at least if those
distinctions were going to have the consequences that the Swift
regime attached to them. But Justice Brandeis’s reference to “equal
protection” did not appear in the constitutional section of his
opinion, and most modern scholars agree that he probably understood that reference less as a constitutional claim than as a policy
argument about fairness.154 As various scholars have noted, the
rhetoric of “equal protection” would not have been the most natural
way for Justice Brandeis to attack the constitutionality of actions by
the federal government, because the Fifth Amendment had not yet
been held to have an equal-protection component.155 In any event,
the sort of “discrimination” that Justice Brandeis decried would not
be understood to violate equal-protection doctrine even today.156
152. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
162 (2000). But cf. Ely, supra note 135, at 712 & n.111 (agreeing that Justice Brandeis was
referring to the statutory restrictions on removal, but considering this point so obvious that
the opinion was not misleading).
153. See White, supra note 104, at 794.
154. See Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1299-300
& n.74 (2007) (citing scholars); see also, e.g., Ely, supra note 135, at 713 (opining that Justice
Brandeis’s reference to equal protection “surely ... was a metaphor,” because the argument
would have been considered untenable as a matter of constitutional law).
155. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937) (“The Fifth Amendment
unlike the Fourteenth has no equal protection clause.”).
156. See, e.g., Green, supra note 5, at 604 (“Brandeis’s use of the term ‘equal protection’ was
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Of course, to say that this “discrimination” was constitutional is
not to say that it was good policy. Even though the distinction
between citizens and noncitizens of the forum state originated with
Congress, one could certainly complain about the consequences that
the Swift regime attached to that distinction. Such complaints,
however, are not naturally limited to the fact that noncitizens of the
forum state could remove suits to federal court more readily than
citizens could. Instead, modern scholars who endorse the “antidiscrimination” strain of Justice Brandeis’s opinion in Erie tend to
make a broader argument: in their view, it is arbitrary and unfair
for the substantive outcomes of cases to depend on whether the
parties have access to federal court or instead are proceeding in
state court.157 So conceived, the complaint about “discrimination”
may simply be a different way of packaging Justice Brandeis’s
concerns about vertical disuniformity and opportunities for forum
shopping.
C. Constitutional Arguments
According to Justice Brandeis, if Swift had involved “only a
question of statutory construction,” the practical problems that he
identified would not have been enough to overcome stare decisis and
persuade the Court “to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century.”158 But Justice Brandeis believed that
stare decisis should be weaker in constitutional cases than in
statutory cases,159 and he further believed that Erie was a constitutional case: in his view, “the unconstitutionality of the course
pursued [under Swift] has now been made clear.”160 Although some
of the Justices who joined the majority opinion may not really have
not constitutionally serious at the time, and modern equal protection jurisprudence has
likewise ignored it.”).
157. See, e.g., Peter Westen, After “Life for Erie”—A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REV. 971, 980-81
(1980).
158. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938).
159. See, e.g., Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); cf. Lee J. Strang & Bryce G. Poole, The Historical (In)Accuracy of the Brandeis
Dichotomy: An Assessment of the Two-Tiered Standard of Stare Decisis for Supreme Court
Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REV. 969 (2008) (arguing that although Justice Brandeis claimed
historical support for this idea, the Federal Supreme Court’s practice on this point actually
originated with him).
160. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
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shared that view,161 Brandeis certainly wrote as if constitutional
arguments were crucial to his own vote in Erie.
Still, Justice Brandeis did not make clear exactly what his
constitutional arguments were. The summary that he offered at the
end of his opinion sounded in federalism: “We ... declare that in
applying the [Swift] doctrine this Court and the lower courts have
invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution
to the several States.”162 But the rationale for that conclusion was
opaque.
Early in his opinion, Justice Brandeis did observe that some of
the questions that the federal courts had classified as matters of
“general” law lay beyond the reach of the legislative powers that the
Constitution vests in Congress. With respect to such questions,
Justice Brandeis noted, federal courts applying Swift had “assumed
... the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was
confessedly without power to enact as statutes.”163 The rhetoric of
this passage suggests that the Swift regime amounted to an
impermissible end run around the fact that the Constitution gives
the federal government only limited and enumerated legislative
powers.164
161. See PURCELL, supra note 152, at 108-14 (pointing to internal correspondence and
subsequent statements by other members of the Court); cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 90-92 (Reed, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (endorsing the majority opinion “except
in so far as it relies upon the unconstitutionality of the ‘course pursued’ by the federal
courts”).
162. Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
163. Id. at 72.
164. To be sure, Justice Brandeis probably believed that the particular question at issue
in Erie came within the reach of the federal government’s legislative powers. The Supreme
Court had long held that in the exercise of its powers to regulate interstate commerce,
Congress could impose legal duties on interstate railroads “to secure the safety of the persons
and property transported [in interstate commerce] and of those who are employed in such
transportation.” S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911) (upholding the Safety
Appliance Acts); see also Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 46-52 (1912)
(upholding the Federal Employers’ Liability Act). Given his position in other debates about
congressional power, Justice Brandeis probably would have read these precedents broadly
enough to let Congress regulate interstate railroads to protect the safety of passersby too. Cf.
Ely, supra note 135, at 703 n.62 (“Congressional legislation based upon the commerce clause
certainly could have covered the specific question at issue in Erie.”). Still, Swift’s
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act did leave room for the federal courts to articulate
substantive rules of decision on matters that the federal government’s legislative powers did
not reach. Ordinarily, moreover, when courts are choosing between two interpretations of a
federal statute, the fact that one would have some unconstitutional applications is a reason
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Subsequent commentators have added a separation-of-powers
theme.165 Even if Congress has the power to make law in a particular area, federal courts do not automatically have the same power.
Under the Constitution, after all, the federal government’s legislative power is vested in Congress, not the judiciary.166 If one thinks
that articulating rules in the style of the common law is essentially
“legislative,” then one might conclude that federal courts applying
the Swift regime were doing things that the federal government can
properly do only through Congress.
At least when stated so simply, both of these arguments rest on
a common premise: what courts do when they articulate rules of
common law (or unwritten law more generally) is the same sort of
thing that legislatures do when they enact statutes. This analogy
was certainly in the air in the 1920s and 1930s.167 But legal thinkers
of the day did not take it literally. Unlike a legislature (which,
within constitutional limits, can prescribe whatever rules of decision
it likes), courts articulating the content of the unwritten law were
not thought to enjoy unfettered creative power. While Justice
Brandeis surely believed that the process of deciding common-law
cases entailed some element of policymaking,168 he presumably
to prefer the other. See id. (“The Erie opinion’s point was that there was no constitutional
basis for the sort of general lawmaking authority exercised under the Swift doctrine; that
Congress therefore could not have delegated such general authority to the courts; and that
the Act consequently should not be construed to have done so.”).
165. See Green, supra note 5, at 615 (noting that for the past few decades, scholars who
play up Erie’s constitutional basis have “focus[ed] on separation of powers” and have
suggested that “Erie’s principal concern was to eliminate undue judicial policymaking”);
Sherry, supra note 100, at 144 (similarly identifying a shift away from arguments about
“federalism-derived limits on congressional authority” and toward arguments about “judicial
federalism and separation of powers”).
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
... Congress.”).
167. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 119 (1921)
(“Everywhere there is growing emphasis on the analogy between the function of the judge and
the function of the legislator.”); cf. Helen Silving, Analogies Extending and Restricting Federal
Jurisdiction: Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and the Law of Conflict, 31 IOWA L. REV. 330, 334 (1946)
(“[J]urisprudence has of late discovered decisional law to be Law in somewhat the same sense
as is statutory law.”).
168. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890) (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of new
rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands of society.”); cf.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Editor’s Introductory Essay, in LOUIS D. BRANDEIS’S MIT LECTURES
ON LAW (1892-1894) ix, xxii-xxviii (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. ed., 2012) [hereinafter BRANDEIS’S
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believed that the process also involved many other elements,
including fidelity to accepted modes of legal reasoning, customs, and
other preexisting principles that constrain courts even though they
are unwritten.169 That was certainly the view of other mainstream
jurists of his time.170
In keeping with this view, Erie’s modern supporters do not all
insist that unwritten law is always and inevitably judge-made law.
Professor Bradford Clark (who is the most vigorous and sophisticated defender of the idea that the Federal Constitution provides a
solid basis for Erie) concedes that at the time of Swift v. Tyson,
courts applying the general commercial law “were not engaged in
unrestrained judicial lawmaking.”171 Even today, indeed, Professor
Clark acknowledges that something similar can be said in many
enclaves of what is now called “federal common law.” As Professor
Alfred Hill explained nearly fifty years ago, certain realms of
domestic American law have been “federalized” either by the
Constitution or by federal statutes that occupy particular fields to
the exclusion of state law.172 But while written federal law strips the
states of lawmaking authority in these enclaves, it does not itself
answer every legal question that might arise. To handle certain
kinds of questions that arise within these enclaves but that written
federal law does not answer, courts have articulated rules of socalled “federal common law”—rules that are thought to have the
status of federal law even though they have not been enacted in
written form. Although the content of these rules is a matter of
unwritten law, Professor Clark denies that it simply reflects the
naked policy preferences of whichever judge is articulating it. In his
MIT LECTURES] (noting that Brandeis became less celebratory of the common law, and more
appreciative of legislation, after violence connected with the Homestead Strike of 1892).
169. Cf. Louis D. Brandeis, The Nature and Origin of Law (unpublished lecture), in
BRANDEIS’S MIT LECTURES, supra note 168, at 125, 127 (discussing origins of the common law
and emphasizing custom as a source of rules of decision).
170. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 167, at 141 (“The judge, even when he is free, is still not
wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure.”); cf. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE
FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 6 (2010) (debunking modern
caricatures of the “legal realists” of the 1930s and invoking Cardozo as an exponent of the
“balanced realism” that Professor Tamanaha takes to have been dominant).
171. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1245, 1287 (1996).
172. Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1028, 1031 (1967).
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view, many of the relevant rules instead grow out of structural
inferences derived from the Constitution itself.173 One might also
trace various rules of “federal common law” to other external
sources, including policies reflected in federal statutes, customs
supplied by the private sector, and the collective thrust of the
written and unwritten law in force in each state.174 To the extent
that these sources impose legal constraints on the content of the
rules that courts articulate, Professor Clark agrees that those rules
are not best described as “federal judge-made law.”175
But while Professor Clark does not endorse the simplistic view
that judges are automatically engaging in “legislative” behavior
when they articulate and expound rules of unwritten law, he
nonetheless defends Justice Brandeis’s conclusion that Erie has a
constitutional basis. The key to his argument is the claim that the
arrangements reflected in Swift v. Tyson eventually led federal
courts to “disregard state law” (and to do so even though federal law
had not validly displaced the state law that the courts were
disregarding).176 In Professor Clark’s view, Swift did not necessarily
have this effect in the early days, because the state courts themselves may not have considered their understanding of the general
commercial law to be “state law”; at the time of Swift, “state and
federal courts appeared to be jointly administering a customary
body of rules common to many jurisdictions,”177 and state courts
articulating the content of those rules “did not clearly conceive of
themselves as establishing binding principles of state law distinct
from the general law merchant.”178 But as time wore on, Professor
Clark asserts, “state courts increasingly abandoned reliance on the
general law merchant in favor of ... localized commercial doctrines”
that were properly characterized as “state judge-made law.”179
During the same period, moreover, “the federal courts vastly
expanded the range of legal questions subject to the Swift doctrine”
173. Clark, supra note 171, at 1251.
174. See generally Nelson, supra note 28 (discussing where courts get the content of the
“federal common law” that they recognize in enclaves federalized by Congress or the
Constitution).
175. Clark, supra note 171, at 1251.
176. Clark, supra note 154, at 1302.
177. Clark, supra note 171, at 1276.
178. Id. at 1286.
179. Id. at 1290.

978

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:921

so as to encompass various topics that the state courts had thought
of as state law all along.180 Because of these twin developments,
Professor Clark concludes that the Swift doctrine eventually led
federal courts to disregard substantive rules of state law (as
declared by state courts). That result, he argues, violated constitutionally grounded principles of “judicial federalism”: federal courts
are obliged to apply state law on topics that lie within the states’
legislative competence, unless the Federal Constitution, federal
statutes, or federal treaties supply supervening rules.181
This argument has long and respectable roots.182 It also dovetails
with certain jurisprudential premises that Justice Brandeis
endorsed in Erie and that he presented as being intertwined with
his constitutional argument.183 The constitutional section of
Brandeis’s opinion quoted liberally from Justice Holmes’s famous
dissent in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co.184 There, Holmes had opined that the Swift
doctrine might have made sense if the common law were “a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.”185
According to Holmes, however, that conception of the common law
was a “fallacy,” because “law in the sense in which courts speak of
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., id. at 1291 (“[F]ederal courts violated principles of judicial federalism by
disregarding state law in areas over which the states possessed undoubted legislative
competence and over which Congress either lacked constitutional power or at least had failed
to exercise such power.” (footnotes omitted)). For people who want to locate the relevant
constitutional principles in a particular provision, Professor Clark points to the Supremacy
Clause. In his view, “the Supremacy Clause establishes the exclusive basis for overriding state
law,” meaning that “federal courts ... lack constitutional authority to disregard state law”
unless “the ‘Constitution,’ ‘Laws,’ or ‘Treaties’ of the United States” so require. Clark, supra
note 154, at 1302.
182. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427,
427-28 (1958) (“Erie does indeed have a constitutional basis—in the sense that our system of
federalism is rooted in the Constitution, and that the failure of a federal court to give due
regard to state law ... inevitably thwarts the constitutional scheme of things.”).
183. But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism,
84 VA. L. REV. 673, 673, 675 (1998) (arguing that whatever Justice Brandeis may have
thought, Erie’s “jurisprudential commitment to legal positivism” does not dictate a particular
answer to the constitutional question that Brandeis was addressing); Green, supra note 67,
at 1128 (agreeing that “the Swiftian view of the common law is compatible with positivism”).
184. 276 U.S. 518 (1928); see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting
Holmes’s dissent in the taxicab case).
185. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.”186
To the extent that the common law is enforced in any particular
state on matters lying within that state’s legislative jurisdiction,
Holmes insisted that it “is not the common law generally but the
law of that State existing by the authority of that State without
regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else.”187 In
Erie, Justice Brandeis used these statements to support his suggestion that when federal courts applied the Swift doctrine, they
were “ignoring” what Brandeis characterized as “the law of the
State” under circumstances that gave them no warrant to do so.188
As a rhetorical matter, both Holmes and Brandeis emphasized
the first part of this argument—the claim that on matters lying
within the legislative jurisdiction of individual states, even the
“general” portion of the unwritten law in force in each state should
be regarded as state law. But one could readily accept that claim
without rejecting Swift. Even during the heyday of Swift, in fact, the
Federal Supreme Court often did accept that claim; long before Erie,
the Court repeatedly described much of the general law as state
law.189 While conceding that (1) federal courts are obliged to apply
state law in the absence of supervening federal law and (2) the
“general” portion of the unwritten law in force within each state is
properly characterized as state law, defenders of Swift could still
maintain that (3) it is possible for a state’s supreme court to be
wrong about the content of the state’s law and (4) federal courts are
not “ignoring the [state’s] common law”190 when they follow their
own understanding of the state’s common law rather than statecourt precedents that they believe to be incorrect.
To be sure, this response would puzzle many modern lawyers.
Perhaps because those lawyers have integrated Erie into their
understanding of judicial federalism, they assume that federal
courts have a legal obligation to follow the precedents of each state’s
highest court about the content of every type of state law in force in
that state. But the basis of this assumption is obscure. What is the

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 533-34.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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source of the alleged obligation to accept what each state’s highest
court says about the content of state law?
Holmes himself tried to answer that question by pointing to state
constitutional law. For the most part, the people of each state are in
charge of how to structure their state’s government and how to
allocate the state’s lawmaking power among the different branches
of that government; subject to a few relatively minor exceptions, the
Federal Constitution neither regulates that topic itself nor empowers Congress to do so.191 Thus, if the constitution of a particular
state explicitly declared that “on all matters of general law [within
the state’s legislative competence] the decisions of the highest
[state] Court sh[all] establish the [state’s] law until modified by
statute or by a later decision of the same Court,” Holmes thought it
clear that federal courts would have no basis for “refus[ing] to follow
what the State Court decided in that domain.”192 Of course, no state
constitution actually includes such an explicit allocation of the
state’s lawmaking authority to the state’s highest court. But Holmes
believed that this allocation was implicit in each and every state
constitution: simply by virtue of the fact that each state constitution
establishes a state supreme court, each state constitution “by
implication does make that declaration as clearly as if it had said it
in express words, so far as it is not interfered with by the superior
power of the United States.”193
As Michael Steven Green and other modern scholars have
concluded, this premise about state constitutional law helps account
for Justice Brandeis’s claim that the course pursued by the federal
courts under Swift v. Tyson violated the Federal Constitution.194 If
191. See, e.g., Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)
(“How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if
not always, a question for the state itself.”).
192. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 534 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 534-35.
194. See Green, supra note 67, at 1125-26 (noting that if Holmes were correct that each and
every state constitution had the meaning that he attributed to it, then Brandeis’s conclusion
in Erie would follow); Steven Walt, Before the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and the MidCentury Opposition to Erie, 2 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 75, 86 (2010) (noting the
importance of Holmes’s argument about state constitutional law to Brandeis’s opinion in
Erie); White, supra note 104, at 800 (alluding to the same argument as a possible basis for
Justice Brandeis’s constitutional claim in Erie); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate over
Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 490-91 (2002) (taking Erie to endorse
Holmes’s claim about state constitutions); W. David Sarratt, Note, Judicial Takings and the
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each state’s constitution gives the state’s supreme court authority
to prescribe the state’s law (subject to override by the state legislature), and if it also specifies that the supreme court exercises this
authority whenever it announces a holding about the content of
state law, then whatever the state supreme court says about state
law is state law. Nothing in the Federal Constitution prevents a
state from structuring its lawmaking power this way, and nothing
in the Federal Constitution instructs federal courts to refuse to
enforce rules of state law that have been established by the state’s
supreme court rather than enacted by the state’s legislature. In fact,
the Federal Constitution probably does not even authorize Congress
to give the federal courts that instruction: such an instruction would
meddle with the internal structure of state government in a way
that probably goes beyond Congress’s enumerated powers.195 As
Justice Brandeis expressed this point (at the very start of his
constitutional analysis in Erie), “whether the law of the state shall
be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in
a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”196 On this view, a
federal statute that means what Swift interpreted the Rules of
Decision Act to mean would interfere with state governance in a
way that violates the Federal Constitution. Thus, if one starts from
the premise that state constitutions do indeed allocate authority to
prescribe state law in the way that Justice Holmes believed, then
one might well arrive at the bottom line that Justice Brandeis
reached in Erie.

Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV. 1487, 1522-28 (2004) (summarizing and explaining the
argument).
195. See, e.g., Robert S. Peck & John Vail, Blame It on the Bee Gees: The Attack on Trial
Lawyers and Civil Justice, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 338 (2006-07) (“Congress ... holds no
authority to select among branches of state government that branch which can declare
federally cognizable law.”).
196. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). After an intervening quotation from
Justice Field (which Brandeis expanded during the drafting process to please Chief Justice
Hughes, see PURCELL, supra note 152, at 179), Brandeis’s opinion returned to this theme with
a quotation from Holmes’s dissent in the taxicab case. In the quoted passage, Holmes began
by observing that each state is the “only authority” behind the common law as it is enforced
in that state. Holmes concluded that therefore “the voice adopted by the State as its
own”—and here Brandeis added in brackets, “whether [that] be of its Legislature or of its
Supreme Court”—“should utter the last word.” Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White
Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 535 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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There are good reasons to think that Brandeis shared Holmes’s
premise about the prescriptive authority that each state constitution gives the state’s supreme court. Not only did Brandeis join
Holmes’s dissent in the taxicab case, but the portion of Erie that
focuses on the Federal Constitution both opens and closes with
references to the argument that I have just summarized.197 In
addition, Holmes’s premise accounts for Erie’s precise holding: on
matters that lie within the states’ legislative competence, federal
courts are obliged to follow the precedents that a particular state’s
supreme court establishes (and continues to accept) to the same
extent that federal courts would follow identical rules declared by
the same state’s legislature. Holmes’s premise also explains why,
from the start, Erie was not thought to bear on the federal courts’
practices in enclaves of “federal common law” that lie beyond the
states’ lawmaking power.198
To the extent that Erie’s constitutional analysis rests on Holmes’s
premise, though, it is questionable. The typical state constitution
certainly does not give the state supreme court the same sort of
direct authority to prescribe state law that it gives the state
legislature. Subject only to constitutional limits, legislatures can
announce whatever legal rules they like, and those rules automatically are the law of the state. What courts do is different. In many
cases, the rules that they can legitimately articulate are constrained
either by preexisting written laws or by preexisting sources of
unwritten law (such as real-world customs). Even after the state
supreme court has issued an opinion, moreover, people might say
that the opinion is wrong about the true content of state law. One
could not make the same statement about a state statute.
197. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; see also Hart, supra note 133, at 512
(identifying “the essential rationale of the Erie opinion” as “the need of recognizing the state
courts as organs of coordinate authority with other branches of the state government in the
discharge of the constitutional functions of the states”).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 172-175 (discussing “federal common law”); see
also, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (“[T]he doctrine of
[Erie] is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the policy of the law is
so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which they affect must be
deemed governed by federal law.”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 34950 (1939) (distinguishing Erie); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304
U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (Brandeis, J.) (referring to “a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which
neither the statutes nor the decisions of [a particular] State can be conclusive”).
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Admittedly, the fact that state supreme courts cannot legitimately exercise unfettered discretion is tempered by the fact that
even their erroneous decisions do set precedents for later cases.
From the standpoint of the lower state courts, indeed, the
precedential effect of those decisions is usually absolute: lower state
courts are supposed to apply precedents established by the state
supreme court even if they themselves would have understood the
law differently. But this effect of the typical state supreme court’s
decisions is not necessarily connected with the state’s lawmaking
power. To the contrary, decisions of the state supreme court have
the same effect within the state even when they are about the
content of other sovereigns’ laws. For instance, if the supreme court
of a state adopts a particular gloss on a federal statute, the state’s
lower courts are typically supposed to follow that gloss (at least
until the Federal Supreme Court addresses the same issue and
adopts a different gloss). As this fact suggests, the doctrines of
precedent that determine the effect of the typical state supreme
court’s holdings may well have less to do with the scope of the
state’s legislative power than with the scope of the state supreme
court’s appellate jurisdiction.199 Relatedly, while there is certainly
a sense in which a state supreme court is “making law” when it
establishes a precedent that the lower state courts are supposed to
follow, it is not necessarily prescribing state law in the same way
that a state legislature does. To appreciate the potential complexity
of concepts of precedent, just consider the following question: When
a state supreme court interprets a federal statute in a way that sets
a precedent for lower courts in the same state, has the state
supreme court made state law or federal law?
I personally am skeptical of Justice Holmes’s premise across the
board: I am not sure that any state constitution really gives the
state supreme court authority to establish “state law” of a sort that
the Federal Constitution obliges federal courts to accept in the same
way that they accept state statutes. But as Professor Green has
observed, even if some state constitutions do indeed allocate the
state’s prescriptive authority in the way that Justice Holmes
199. Cf. Harrison, supra note 23, at 518-19 (discussing the apparent linkage between
appellate jurisdiction and doctrines of precedent within the federal judiciary, but cautioning
against oversimplification).
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imagined, other state constitutions may not. At least as a matter of
original understanding, for instance, one might well doubt that the
Massachusetts Constitution (which dates back to 1780) really
allocates the state’s lawmaking authority in a manner consistent
with Holmes’s modernist philosophy.200 In any event, insofar as the
meaning of state constitutions is a matter of state law, Justices
Holmes and Brandeis would presumably feel obliged to pay
attention if a state supreme court rejected their interpretation of the
state’s constitution—with the result that even if Justice Holmes’s
argument were otherwise solid, it might lead to the conclusion that
federal courts should apply the Erie doctrine “on a state-by-state
basis” rather than nationwide.201
More can be said about the constitutional dimension of Erie, but
the essential points are simple. First, Justice Brandeis’s constitutional argument may well have rested on a premise about how each
and every state constitution allocates the state’s prescriptive
authority—the power to make “state law” of a sort that the Federal
Constitution obliges federal courts to respect. Second, that premise
is at least contestable and may be false. In sum, Erie’s claim that
practice under Swift violated the Federal Constitution may well
have rested on a debatable interpretation of each and every state
constitution.
CONCLUSION
Insofar as Justice Brandeis read his conclusion into the Rules of
Decision Act, I am inclined to think that he was wrong: as originally
enacted, and as understood for the first 149 years of its existence,
the Rules of Decision Act did not require federal courts to equate the
200. See MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX (“In the government of this commonwealth, ... the
judicial [department] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them.”); cf. Sarratt, supra note 194, at 1525 (noting that Holmes’s argument rested on “a
decidedly legal realist interpretation of state constitutions”). One might also wonder how
Holmes’s premise would apply to the Texas Constitution, which creates two separate courts
of last resort—one for civil cases and another for criminal cases. See TEX. CONST. art. 5, §§ 3,
5 (dividing jurisdiction between the Texas Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals).
201. Green, supra note 67, at 1125; see also id. at 1126-27 (noting that the state courts of
Georgia “still conceive of the common law in Swiftian terms,” and concluding that if the case
for Erie rests on Holmes’s argument, then federal courts should exercise independent
judgment about the content of the common law in force in Georgia).
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unwritten law in force in each state with whatever the state’s
highest court says it is. I am also skeptical of Justice Brandeis’s
constitutional argument. I agree that if the constitution of a
particular state gives the state’s supreme court the same sort of
prescriptive authority that it gives the state’s legislature, and if the
state’s supreme court exercises this authority to make a particular
rule of state law, then federal courts should indeed accept and apply
that rule to the same extent that they would accept and apply an
identical rule made in the form of a statute by the state legislature.
But I am inclined to doubt that any state constitution really does
give the state’s supreme court this sort of prescriptive authority. As
I understand the typical state constitution, holdings of the state’s
supreme court have a different legal character than the state’s
statutes. As I understand the Federal Constitution, moreover, it
does not require federal courts to overlook this difference, and to
treat the decisions of each state’s highest court as dictating the
content of state law in the same way that a state statute would.
Thus, I do not think that written federal law compels the result in
Erie rather than the result in Swift.
Still, there are practical reasons why it might be best for federal
courts to follow state-court precedents on matters of the sort that
Erie addresses. And while I do not think that either section 34 of the
original Judiciary Act or its descendants can properly be interpreted
to require this arrangement, they also do not forbid this arrangement. In my view, that is the most charitable position that one can
take about Erie: although Justice Brandeis was wrong to attribute
his position to the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act,
written federal law did not foreclose the bottom line that he
reached.202
This line of thinking leads to an ironic conclusion. If I am right,
the deference that federal courts owe to state-court precedents about
the content of state law is not something that written federal law
addresses one way or the other, but it is a question that federal
202. Cf. Harry Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336, 1346 (1938)
(“[T]he Court in the Tompkins case could have left constitution and statute alone and
announced its view that present public policy, in the absence of legislation, requires an
adherence to state decisions. That would have involved only change of judge-made rule based
on a stated policy to conform with a change of judicial view as to that policy in the light of
experience.”).
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courts face every day and on which they need an answer. In that
sense, the Erie doctrine might best be characterized as what modern
lawyers call “federal common law.”

